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Abstract
The current global-imbalance literature (which explains why capital ￿ ows from poor to rich
countries) is unable to explain China￿ s foreign asset positions because capital cannot ￿ ow out
of China under capital controls. Hence, this literature has not succeeded in explaining China￿ s
large and persistent trade imbalances with the United States. A closely related but deeper
puzzle that this literature fails to address is China￿ s high household saving rate despite an
astonishingly rapid income growth rate. This paper shows that a modi￿ed (and calibrated)
Melitz (2003) model can qualitatively and quantitatively explain China￿ s trade surplus and its
massive accumulation of low-yield foreign reserves. The simple in￿nite-horizon model is also
consistent with the stylized fact that high saving is the consequence of high growth (Modigliani
and Cao, 2004), which the permanent income theory and global-imbalance literature fail to
predict.
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11 Introduction
Recent advances in international trade theory attempt to explain the patterns of trade at the
country, industry, and ￿rm levels.1 However, it has little to o⁄er on the question of why trade
may be imbalanced between countries over a prolonged period. According to Deardor⁄ (2010),
standard trade theories cannot explain why developing countries (such as China) with comparative
advantages in producing future goods have been running trade surpluses while industrial nations
(such as the United States) with comparative advantages in producing present goods are running
trade de￿cits. That is, from the viewpoint of the current trade theories, the steady increase in
China￿ s trade balance from a small de￿cit (-$1.1 billion) in 1978 (the beginning year of economic
reform) to a gigantic surplus ($400 billion) in the ￿rst half of 2009 is a puzzle.2
The international ￿nance approach to the trade imbalance puzzle is to model conditions under
which China￿ s domestic savings exceed domestic investment so that China should experience capital
out￿ ows. Between 1978 and 2009, China￿ s foreign exchange reserves (mostly U.S. dollars) increased
dramatically, from $2 billion to $2.4 trillion￿ a more than 1,000-fold expansion￿ making China the
world￿ s largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. Consequently, the accounting identity between
the current account and the capital account implies that China automatically runs a trade surplus.3
Such an approach faces two fundamental challenges. First, why is China￿ s astonishing 45%
investment-to-GDP ratio not able to fully absorb its domestic savings? How can the notoriously
high household saving rate in China be explained when household income has been growing at 10%
per year and the real return to household saving is negative? Second, even if a su¢ ciently high
saving rate in excess of the investment rate can be generated by a model, such a saving-investment
imbalance may still run counter to China￿ s reality: (i) If domestic savings generated from the model
are in the form of ￿xed capital, then the model would predict out￿ ows from China to developed
countries in the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, the reality indicates the opposite:
it is the industrial economies that have been sending FDI to China over the past few decades. (ii)
If the excess domestic savings are in the form of local currency or demand deposits, such ￿nancial
capital cannot leave China because China has capital controls and the renminbi (RMB) is not
internationally convertible. To purchase U.S. government bonds, for example, Chinese savers must
￿rst have dollars in hand. Therefore, to explain China￿ s trade surplus through an international-
1See, e.g., the seminal works of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (BEJK, 2004), Chaney (2008), Melitz (2003),
and the rapidly growing literature following these papers.
2The bulk of the surplus results from trade with the U.S. and takes the form of ￿nal consumption goods.
3See, Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009); and Song, Storesletten,
and Zilibotti (2011), among others.
2￿nance approach, the "excess savings" must be in the form of consumption goods instead of assets.
But this conclusion revisits the trade imbalance puzzle: Why is China exporting more goods than
it is importing?
Resolving the trade imbalance puzzle thus requires not only starting with a basic trade frame-
work with exporters as the main actors, but also ￿nd new ways to model the micro-incentives for the
demand of low-yield liquid assets (such as dollars and U.S. government bonds). Conventional ap-
proaches to model the demand for low-yield assets, such as those with cash-in-advance constraints or
money-in-the-utility assumptions, are inadequate since the optimal asset demand in such models is
proportional to consumption, which is inconsistent with Chinese data: The consumption-to-income
ratio in China has been declining while the foreign reserve-to-GDP ratio has been increasing over
the past decades.
Figure 1. Aggregate Saving Rate (N) and Consumption Ratio (￿).
This paper develops a simple, analytically tractable model to qualitatively and quantitatively
explain China￿ s trade surplus and foreign-reserve buildups in recent decades. The model builds on
the current trade framework with heterogeneous ￿rms (see, e.g., Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Bernard
et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003; and Ghironi and Melitz, 2005), but we start where the existing trade
literature ends; namely, we take the existence of an export sector (with heterogeneous ￿rms) as
given and embed it into a monetary growth model featuring incomplete markets (e.g., Bewley, 1980;
Lucas, 1980; Aiyagari, 1994) and long-run productivity growth.
3Our theory predicts that when exporters (i) face uninsured risks that remain constant over
time as income grows and (ii) are subject to borrowing constraints, their marginal propensity to
save increases with income growth. That is, the more income they earn, the larger portion of the
income will they save, in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom based on Friedman￿ s (1957)
permanent income hypothesis (PIH). Indeed, during the 30 years of China￿ s rapid economic growth,
its private consumption-to-GDP ratio has fallen from roughly 50% in 1980 to 35% in 2008 (see the
C/Y ratio in Figure 1), while government spending as a fraction of total national income has
remained roughly constant at about 14%. Thus, Chinese consumers have reduced their propensity
to consume signi￿cantly despite the rapidly rising per capita income. China￿ s national saving rate
(private investment plus net exports over GDP) has also increased steadily over the past 30 years,
from 34% to 51% (see the (I+NX)/Y ratio in Figure 1).
Figure 2. Household Saving Ratio (left scale) and Income Growth (right scale)
Our model is also consistent with a well-known stylized fact that is not well explained by the
existing literature: Lagged income growth is a strong predictor of future saving rates￿ or high
saving is the consequence of high growth (e.g., Modigliani and Cao, 2004). Figure 2 depicts the
household saving ratio (blue diamonds, left axis) and the long-term growth rate of household income
(red squares, right axis) for the 1953-2006 period. The household saving rate is de￿ned as the ratio
between net wealth changes and disposable income, and the long-term income-growth rate is de￿ned
as the average growth rate of household income of the past 14 years, following Modigliani and Cao
4(2004). The ￿gure shows that the household saving rate tracks the past average income growth rate
very closely and has increased steadily since 1978. The average saving rate was about 5% before
1978 when the average income growth rate was about 2% per year. After the economic reform, the
saving rate increased to over 35% after 1994 when the average rate of household income growth
reached near 10% per year. The extraordinary Chinese saving rate and its positive association with
income growth are not unique. Similar high saving rates have also been observed in other emerging
economies during their rapid-growth periods, such as Japan in the 1960-70s, Hong Kong in the
1980s, and Taiwan and South Korea in the 1990s (see, e.g., Wang and Wen, 2011).
Our analysis suggests that given the elastic labor supply from China￿ s rural areas and the rapid
growth in export income (e.g., due to a comparative advantage in labor costs and an expanding
world market for Chinese goods), ￿nancial frictions in China will naturally lead to massive trade
surplus and foreign-reserve buildups. The faster the export income grows, the larger is the foreign
reserve-to-GDP ratio. In fact, China￿ s total imports-to-exports ratio has fallen during the fast-
growth period, from 1.6 in 1985 to around 0.8 in 2008. That is, while exports have grown at
a double-digit annual rate, total imports have failed to keep pace. As a result, China￿ s trade
surplus and foreign reserves have exploded. Therefore, the data suggest that Chinese households
might have been saving an increasingly larger portion of their income (including dollars earned from
international trade) to provide the safety net and self-insurance unavailable to them from markets.4
Such a precautionary saving motive is also supported by the fact that the bulk of the household
saving in China consists of bank deposits despite low interest rates.5 The average real interest rate
in China remained essentially at zero or negative values in the post-reform period. For example,
the average nominal 3-month deposit rate was 3.3%, the average 1-year rate was 5.6% (see the line
with green triangles in Figure 2, left axis), while the average in￿ ation rate was about 6% in the
1991-2007 period.6
Many analysts believe that the steady increase in America￿ s trade de￿cit with China is the
consequence of a signi￿cantly undervalued Chinese currency. In other words, Chinese goods are
too cheap relative to American goods. Hence, Americans can buy many Chinese goods while the
Chinese can barely a⁄ord American goods. Indeed, some economists and politicians in the U.S. have
alleged that the Chinese government has been manipulating its currency to deliberately achieve a
large trade surplus and an excessive amount of foreign reserves. This paper argues that the trade
4Even though China has experienced impressive economic growth over the past 30 years since its economic reform
and entering the global marketplace, its ￿nancial reform has not kept pace with its economic growth. Because of the
lack of social safety nets and severely underdeveloped insurance and ￿nancial markets, Chinese workers must save
excessively (including dollars earned from international trade) to insure themselves against idiosyncratic uncertainty,
such as bad income shocks, unemployment risk, accidents, and unexpected spending for housing, education, health
care, and so on.
5Wen (2009b) shows that in China and India the share of cash and bank deposits accounts for more than 90% of
total household ￿nancial wealth.
6Data for the interest rates before 1990 are not available.
5imbalance puzzle has little to do with the real exchange rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a benchmark model with
heterogeneous exporters (entrepreneurs) facing borrowing constraints and uninsured risks, charac-
terizes general equilibrium of the model, and derives decision rules for consumption, saving, and
production in closed form. Section 3 studies the relationship between the aggregate saving rate and
the income growth rate along a balanced growth path and a stochastic growth path, respectively.
Section 4 uses the model to predict China￿ s trade surplus and foreign-reserve buildups. Section
5 explores the implications of the model for other dimensions. Section 6 and Appendix B (not
for publication) discusses some robustness issues pertaining to the model structure and parameter




Some important caveats are in order before we describe the model. A key assumption in this paper
is that idiosyncratic risk facing entrepreneurs remains constant over time despite long-run growth￿
that is, the percentage changes in entrepreneur income (consumption) are stationary regardless of
the rate of income (consumption) growth. This assumption implies that idiosyncratic income shocks
have constant variances and are multiplicative to the income level but additive to the logarithm
of income. This assumption is consistent not only with the data but also with a large body of
the empirical and theoretical segments of the literature that measure and model idiosyncratic
uncertainty.7 In contrast, if idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be additive to the income level
(instead of its logarithm), then idiosyncratic risk will diminish to zero on a balanced growth path,
rendering it irrelevant for the analysis.
Of course, a constant income risk implies that the variance of absolute income (i.e., the gap
between actual income level and its exponential growth trend) is increasing over time. However,
an increasing variance of the absolute income does not imply an increasing income risk because
the correct measure of risk is the percentage of ￿ uctuations in income. A multiplicative shock to
the income trend simply means that the variance of logged income (i.e., the gap between logged
7A large body of the empirical literature ￿nds that the idiosyncratic component of logged household income
(consumption) is stationary over time (see, e.g., DeBacker, Heim, Panousi, and Vidangos, 2010, Gottschalk and
Mo¢ tt, 1994, 2009; Mo¢ tt and Gottschalk, 1995, 2008; Haider, 2001, Heathcote, Perri, and Violante, 2010; Sabelhaus
and Song, 2009; Shin and Solon, 2008; among others). For example, using a large panel of tax returns from the
Internal Revenue Service, DeBacker et al. (2010) ￿nd that the variance (volatility) of logged household income (after
controlling for time trend) has remained stationary over time in the United States for the period 1988-2006; namely,
the standard deviation of percentage changes in income has not diminished but instead has remained constant for
American households.
6income and its time trend) is constant over time.8 The question is this: Will rational entrepreneurs
(households) change their marginal propensity to save in a borrowing constrained economy when the
growth rate of their income changes but the income risk remains constant (that is, the ￿ uctuations
in income remain constant relative to trend regardless of the growth rate)? It is precisely this
lack of such knowledge that has created the big puzzle regarding the high household saving rate in
China despite its well-known 10% per year income growth rate over the past few decades.9
Another caveat is that uncertainty in households￿spending needs (such as unexpected expen-
ditures for health care, education, housing, and unpredictable spending shocks related to personal
accidents and property damages) may be an equally or even more important source of idiosyn-
cratic risk than labor income risk, especially in developing countries where insurance and credit
markets are poorly developed. Wages￿ the main source of household labor income for the majority
of the working population￿ are sticky and highly predictable by individuals. On the other hand,
unexpected expenditures for health care, education, housing, and other spending needs in daily life
tend to grow more rapidly than wage income (because wage income tends to lag in￿ ation in devel-
oping countries while spending costs track in￿ ation very closely and may even outgrow in￿ ation).
Also, costs in health care and housing are large relative to monthly or annual income and ￿ uctuate
signi￿cantly more than wage income.
As an example, the majority of the Chinese population is not e⁄ectively covered by any form
of health care insurance system (Wang, Xu, and Xu, 2007). Data from the 1998 China National
Health Services Survey indicate that medical costs increased by 625% for each clinic visit and 511%
for each hospital admission during the 1990-1998 period (Liu, Rao, and Hsiao, 2003). The average
cost per hospital admission (over-night stay) in 1998 was as high as 2,891 yuan, which is equiva-
lent to 42:5% of annual GDP per capita and 71% of annual consumption per person in that year.
These authors also estimate that the rapid increase in out-of-pocket medical spending in China
raised the number of rural households living below the poverty line by more than 44%. So medical
expenditure has become an important source of transient poverty in rural China. This explains
why Chamon and Prasad (2010) found empirically that the high saving rates of Chinese households
across all demographic groups "are best explained by the rising private burden of expenditures on
housing, education, and heath care" (p. 93).10 This also explains why consumption expenditures
8In other words, an x dollar increase (or decrease) in absolute income provides no information about income risk
unless it is translated into percentage terms.
9Given the income growth trend, a higher income risk would have led to a higher household saving rate under
borrowing constraints. However, this assumption of increasing risk is not needed in this paper to explain China￿ s high
saving rate even though adding it to our model would further enhance our results. Instead, we show that even if the
degree of idiosyncratic risk remains constant relative to income trend, a higher income growth will lead to a higher
saving rate. This is in contrast to the model of Chamon, Liu, and Prasad (2010), who explain the high household
saving rate in China by assuming that the degree of idiosyncratic risk increases over time not only absolutely but
also relative to the trend of income growth.
10Quantitatively speaking, Chamon and Presad (2010) found that health risk is the most important driving force
of household savings because expenditures on housing and education involve less uncertainty and tend to cancel the
7in developing countries are more volatile than income (see, e.g., Mark and Gopinath, 2007). These
considerations lead us to assume in this paper two sources of idiosyncratic uncertainty: one stem-
ming from entrepreneur income and the other from the subsistence level of household consumption
(or preference shocks).11
2.2 Model Setup
This is a small open-economy model. The home country (e.g., China) is denoted by H and the rest
of the world by F. For simplicity, we assume (i) complete international specialization in that home-
produced goods are for export only and home residents consume only foreign-produced goods, and
(ii) F is large enough that the price of tradable goods is not a⁄ected by H￿ s exports and imports.
Let P￿
t denote the nominal price of goods sold in country F in terms of foreign currency (dollars),
which is also the price that H households pay for imported goods from abroad. So trade involves





t￿1 , is assumed
to be constant over time.12
As in Melitz (2003), there is a continuum of heterogeneous entrepreneurs in country H indexed
by i 2 [0;1]. Each entrepreneur operates a linear production technology, Yt(i) = Atvt(i)Nt(i),
where Nt(i) is labor demand,13 vt(i) is an idiosyncratic shock to ￿rm-level productivity, and At
represents aggregate productivity that grows over time according to
At = A0 (1 + ￿ g)
t : (1)
To make the model analytically tractable, however, we change the Melitz production function to
Yt(i) = AtNt(i) + vt(i)At; (2)
where the idiosyncratic shock v(i) can be reinterpreted as cost shocks if taking negative values.
Notice that v(i) is multiplicative to the aggregate growth trend (At) so that idiosyncratic risk
remains constant (instead of diminishing) over time as the economy grows.
Entrepreneurs choose optimal paths of consumption, saving, and production plans subject to
￿nancial constraints. Labor mobility within the country and perfect competition among ￿rms imply
that the real wage in the labor market is given by Wt = At.14 Since the economy has a balanced
growth path, we can transform the model into a stationary economy by scaling (normalizing) all
savings for such purposes across cohorts (see Wang and Wen, 2011).
11We follow the existing literature by using preference shocks as a shortcut for consumption demand shocks.
12The results are not sensitive to this assumption.
13Lu (2010) documents that Chinese exporters are predominantly labor-intensive ￿rms and they sell the bulk of
their output to foreign markets.
14In this paper, "entrepreneurs" and "households" are used interchangeably.
8endogenous variables except hours worked, Nt(i), by the growth factor, (1 + ￿ g)
t. All normalized
variables are denoted by lowercase letters (e.g., xt ￿ Xt
(1+￿ g)t). Note that the rescaled real wage is
given by wt ￿ A0.
There is an international reserve currency (called dollars) in the model that can also serve as the
means of payment for tradable goods. However, we do not impose the standard cash-in-advance
constraint or the money-in-utility assumption to induce money demand. Instead, we motivate
money demand by precautionary saving motives as in Bewley (1980). Thus, if households opt to
hold foreign currency, it is purely for precautionary saving reasons by carrying it as a store of value.
This modeling strategy allows us to combine precautionary saving behavior with money demand
without making other assumptions about why people hold money or low-yield liquid assets.
Nominal (dollar) income earned from exports can be either saved or spent. Foreign reserves are
assumed to be kept by entrepreneurs (households) instead of by the government. Alternatively, we
can allow entrepreneurs to sell dollars to the government and use the proceeds to purchase local
government bonds. In this way, all foreign reserves will then be held by the government in country
H instead of by households, but the results are similar.15 For simplicity, we assume that foreign
reserves earn a zero nominal interest rate; hence, the real rate of return to saving is the inverse of
the in￿ ation rate in country F.16
Entrepreneurs are borrowing and short-sale constrained, as in Bewley (1980). That is, they
cannot hold negative amounts of any assets. Each entrepreneur is subject to two types of idiosyn-
cratic shocks, one stemming from income and another from spending needs (preferences). These
two idiosyncratic shocks are assumed to be i.i.d. and independent of each other. The household
income is given by [Nt(i) + vt(i)]At = Nt(i)Wt + vt(i)At. The additive term vt(i)At captures in-
come outside regular wage earnings and is called "bonus income" in this paper￿ which re￿ ects the
entrepreneur￿ s cost shocks or operating losses (gains) unrelated to labor productivity. Notice that
the random shock to bonus income can take negative values. Empirical studies by Wang (2011)
show that nonwage income is an important component of household disposable income in both
rural and urban China and this component is far more variable than wage earnings (Nt(i)Wt).
The simplest way to model ￿ uctuations in household spending needs (or subsistence consump-
tion) is to introduce an idiosyncratic random variable ￿(i) into the utility function, U(Ct(i) ￿
￿t(i)Wt), where ￿t(i) denotes shocks to the subsistence consumption level and is idiosyncratic
across households. This random variable captures idiosyncratic uncertainty in consumption de-
15Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008, p. 361) point out that "most of these reserves are indirectly held by the
local private sector through (quasi-collateralized) low-return sterilization bonds in a context with only limited capital
account openness."
16A low interest rate goes against our results. The results would be enhanced if we let the government bear the
in￿ ation risk by holding foreign reserves or paying positive interest on households￿foreign currency accounts.
9mand, such as unexpected expenditures related to accidents, illness, housing, education, and so on.
Notice that the subsistence spending shock is also multiplied by the growth trend (the real wage
Wt = A0 (1 + ￿ g)
t) to capture the notion of constant risk. The intuition is that basic spending needs
rise with economic growth. For example, costs in health care and education increase with income
growth. Also, richer people or higher-earning income groups tend to buy bigger houses in more
expensive areas, send their children to more expensive (e.g., private) schools, visit hospitals with
better facilities, or buy medical insurance with more comprehensive coverage. Such spending needs
rise with income and are often viewed as necessary instead of optional.
Alternatively, we can also assume that the preference shock ￿(i) is multiplicative to household
utility, ￿t(i)U(Ct(i)). Because household consumption level grows over time, this alternative mod-
eling strategy avoids the need of scaling the shocks by growth trend At. Although the results
do not depend on whether the preference shocks are additive or multiplicative, a multiplicative
preference shock is more tractable than additive preference shocks; therefore, this paper assumes
multiplicative preference shocks.17
A salient feature of China￿ s labor market is the existence of abundant cheap labor in rural
areas. This feature implies that labor supply in China is highly elastic. However, there also exist
tremendous frictions in China￿ s labor market (i.e., the existence of the so called Hukou system
that restricts farmers to live and work freely in the cities unless they have signed labor contracts
with companies). To capture these characteristics of the Chinese labor market in the simplest
possible way within a neoclassical framework, two additional assumptions are made: (i) The utility
function is quasi-linear (as in the indivisible labor models of Hansen, 1985; Rogerson, 1986; and
Lagos and Wright, 2005); (ii) hours worked are predetermined (quasi-￿xed) within each period￿
i.e., they are determined before observing any idiosyncratic shocks in each period. Together these
two assumptions imply that the elasticity of labor supply is high across periods (or at the aggregate
level along the extensive margin) but low within periods (or at the micro level along the intensive
margin). These implications are also qualitatively consistent with empirical estimates of labor
supply elasticities at macro and micro levels in developed countries (Chang and Kim, 2006). In
addition, these assumptions (especially the quasi-linear utility function) greatly facilitate analytical
tractability of our heterogeneous-agent model.18
Let Mt(i) denote the stock of nominal money balances held by entrepreneur i by the end of
period t￿1, Ct(i) real consumption for imported goods in period t, and Nt(i) hours worked in period
17It is well known in the literature that analytical tractability is extremely hard to obtain in models with hetero-
geneous agents and borrowing constraints even in the very simple endowment model of Bewley (1980) with a single
idiosyncratic shock.
18Technically speaking, because of quasi-linear preference, the assumption of predetermined hours supply ensures
that entrepreneurs cannot use labor income to fully insure themselves against idiosyncratic risks.
10t. Applying the aforementioned transformation, we have m(i) ￿
Mt(i)=P￿
t￿1
(1+￿ g)t , m0(i) ￿
Mt+1(i)=P￿
t
(1+￿ g)t+1 , and
ct(i) ￿
Ct(i)




￿t f￿t(i)logct(i) ￿ aNt(i)g (3)
subject to
c(i) + (1 + ￿ g)m0(i) ￿
1
1 + ￿
m(i) + w[N(i) + v(i)] (4)





, where m0 ￿ mt+1. The cumulative density function of ￿(i) is denoted by









￿; with probability p
￿￿; with probability 1 ￿ p
; (6)
where ￿ ￿ 0 controls the size of the income shock.
Equation (4) is the budget constraint, which states that total income earned from exporting
goods to F can be used to ￿nance purchases of foreign-produced goods and the accumulation of
foreign assets (foreign reserves m0 ￿ m), subject to the borrowing constraint (5). Without loss of
generality, we assume ￿ = 1 in the utility function. Note the following implications of the model:
(i) If there exist only borrowing constraints (but with idiosyncratic uncertainty), since ￿ < 1+￿ g,
entrepreneurs would set consumption equal to total export income (i.e., no need to save). Hence,
trade would always be balanced and there would be no accumulation of foreign reserves.
(ii) If there exist only idiosyncratic risks (but without borrowing constraints), entrepreneurs
would set consumption equal to permanent income by borrowing heavily from outside against
their growing future income. Since agents are much richer in the future than at the present,
country H would opt to run a trade de￿cit with country F, as predicted by the PIH and Deardor⁄
(2010). However, with both borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic risks, the outcome is completely
di⁄erent, as shown below.
2.3 Characterization of General Equilibrium
A general equilibrium is de￿ned as a balanced growth path characterized by the following conditions:
11(i) A sequence of decision rules for each entrepreneur i, fct(i);mt+1(i);Nt(i)g
1
t=0, such that given
the sequence of prices fP￿
t ;Wtg
1
t=0, these decision rules maximize each entrepreneur￿ s lifetime utility
subject to constraints (4) and (5).
(ii) A sequence of demand function for labor, fNtg
1




t=0, the demand function maximizes ￿rms￿pro￿ts.
(iii) The law of large numbers holds and all resource constraints are respected:
Z







P￿ = Yt; (8)
where equation (7) represents the labor market-clearing condition, and equation (8) represents
a balanced budget in the tradable-goods sector. Because this is a small open economy, there
is no market-clearing condition for foreign currency. Hence, equation (8) states that all revenues
generated from exports (P￿Yt) are used to ￿nance either imports (P￿ R
Ct(i)di) or the accumulation
of foreign reserves. In other words, the (nominal) trade de￿cit is represented by net increase in
foreign reserves, Mt+1 ￿ Mt.







Proposition 1 Denoting x ￿ 1
1+￿m(i) + wN(i) as cash in hand net of the bonus income v(i)w,


















[x + ￿w]; with probability p
(9)























(1 + ￿ g)(1 + ￿)
￿
w + ￿w; (11)
where the cuto⁄ variables f￿￿
1;￿￿
2g are determined by the following two equations:









where the function R(￿) satis￿es
R(￿￿

























Proof. See Appendix A.I.
The decision rules for consumption and saving in Proposition 1 are quite intuitive. Optimal
consumption is a concave function of a target wealth adjusted for bonus incomes, xt ￿ ￿w, with




. When the urge to consume
is low (￿(i) < ￿￿), the marginal propensity to consume the bonus-adjusted income is less than 1;
when the urge to consume is high (￿(i) ￿ ￿￿), the marginal propensity to consume equals 1 and the
individual does not save in this period. Therefore, saving is a bu⁄er stock: The entrepreneur saves
for a rainy day in the case of low consumption demand (m0(i) > 0 if ￿(i) < ￿￿), anticipating that
consumption demand may be high in the future. The optimal saving rate also depends on income
shock: It is higher if v(i) = ￿ and lower if v(i) = ￿￿ because the cuto⁄ ￿￿
2 > ￿￿
1. These properties
of the saving behavior, which relates the saving rate to a bonus-income-adjusted wealth target
(xt ￿ ￿wt), have been conjectured by some Japanese economists based on empirical observations
of the high Japanese household saving rates in the 1970s (see, e.g., Ishikawa and Ueda, 1984, and
the literature therein) but have never been proved analytically in theory; they are only numerically
indicated by the bu⁄er-stock saving literature (see, e.g., Deaton, 1991; Aiyagari, 1994, and Carroll,
1992, 1997).
Notice that the optimal cash in hand (net worth) x is independent of i (i.e., identical across
entrepreneurs regardless of income and preference shocks). The intuition for this is that (i) x is
predetermined before the realizations of ￿(i) and v(i), and (ii) the labor supply N(i) can adjust
elastically to target any level of cash in hand before idiosyncratic shocks are realized. That is, since
all entrepreneurs face the same distribution of idiosyncratic shocks at the beginning of each period
and must choose hours worked in advance, the quasi-linear utility function makes it feasible and
optimal that entrepreneurs set their labor supply to target the same level of cash in hand regardless
of the individual￿ s history of asset holdings. That is, x is optimal ex ante given the distributions
of ￿(i) and v(i) and the macroeconomic environment (e.g., the real wage, real interest rate, the
in￿ ation rate, and so on), regardless of initial wealth at the beginning of each period,
m(i)
P￿ . This
property is key to obtaining closed-form solutions but the main insights of this paper do not hinge
critically on this property.







j dF(￿) > 1 for j = 1;2. It captures the
13liquidity value (premium) of cash under borrowing constraints and uninsured risks. Hence, the
e⁄ective rate of return to saving is determined by the real interest rate compounded by the liquidity
premium R. The liquidity premium is decreasing in the cuto⁄ ￿￿
1: dR
d￿￿
1 < 0. That is, with a higher
cuto⁄, the liquidity constraint is less likely to bind, so the liquidity value of savings is lower.
Thus, the left-hand side (LHS) of equation (12) is the shadow marginal cost of saving: The
opportunity cost of not consuming a rapidly rising income is proportional to the income growth
rate. The right-hand side (RHS) of the equation measures the e⁄ective rate of return to saving,
including the real interest rate (￿) and the liquidity premium (R). Hence, optimal saving of an
asset is determined by equating the marginal cost with the marginal bene￿t, taking into account
the liquidity premium of the asset. In equilibrium, the liquidity premium R is thus an increasing
function of income growth ￿ g.
The main intuition is that uninsured risk and borrowing constraints induce precautionary sav-
ings even if the real interest rate is negative (
￿
1+￿ ￿ ￿ < 1). Agents would want to maintain a stable
bu⁄er stock of savings relative to trend income because of the need for self-insurance when the de-
gree of risk does not diminish with economic growth. Since income is a ￿ ow and savings a stock,
when income grows, the stock-to-￿ ow ratio would decline if the saving rate remain unchanged￿
which would hinder the bu⁄er-stock function of savings and reduce the extent of self-insurance
(since the degree of idiosyncratic uncertainty remains constant relative to growth trend). Thus,
the liquidity premium R would increase dramatically unless the saving rate rises. In other words, a
higher liquidity premium or shadow return to saving (due to income growth) would induce a higher
saving rate along the balanced growth path (the steady state).
Using letters without index i to denote aggregate variables and by the law of large numbers,
aggregate (or average) consumption and saving of entrepreneurs are given, respectively, by
c = (1 ￿ p)D(￿￿
1)(x ￿ ￿w) + pD(￿￿
2)(x + ￿w) (15)
(1 + ￿ g)m0 = (1 ￿ p)H(￿￿
1)(x ￿ ￿w) + pH(￿￿
2)(x + ￿w); (16)























dF(￿) 2 (0;1); for j = 1;2: (18)
Note D(￿) + H(￿) = 1 because D(￿) is the average marginal propensity to consume from cash in
hand (x ￿ ￿w) and H(￿) is the marginal propensity to save. The equilibrium path of the model is
14characterized by the sequence fc;m0;x;￿￿
1;￿￿
2g, which can be solved uniquely and explicitly from
equations (11)-(16) once the distributions for ￿(i) and v(i) are speci￿ed.
3 Saving Behavior
3.1 Saving Along a Constant Balanced Growth Path
Clearly, the cuto⁄s f￿￿
1;￿￿
2g determine the aggregate saving-to-income ratio. A higher cuto⁄implies
a larger fraction of savers in the population versus non-savers since
@Hj
@￿￿
j > 0 and
@Dj
@￿￿
j < 0. More
precisely, the saving rate ￿ in the economy is de￿ned as the ratio of net changes in asset position to






(Nt+￿ v)Wt , where ￿ vW = (2p ￿ 1)￿W denotes the expected
bonus income.
Proposition 2 Along a balanced growth path, the aggregate household saving rate is given by
￿ =
g [(1 ￿ p)￿￿
1H1 + p￿￿
2H2]
(1 + g)[(1 ￿ p)￿￿
1 + p￿￿
2] ￿ 1




Proof. See Appendix A.II.
Notice that in the absence of income shocks (￿ = 0), we have ￿￿
1 = ￿￿
2 and H1 = H2, so the
saving rate simpli￿es to
￿ =
￿ gH(￿ g)
1 + ￿ g ￿ 1
1+￿H(￿ g)
; (20)
as originally derived by Wen (2009a). This saving function is remarkably similar to that implied
by the life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954).19 However, the underling mechanisms
are completely di⁄erent. The life-cycle model relies on an aggregation (composition) e⁄ect across
di⁄erent cohorts to generate the positive relationship between income growth and the aggregate
saving rate. To the extent that the economy is growing, workers￿savings will increase relative to
retirees￿dissavings (as if the population is expanding); thus, the measured aggregate saving rate
will increase with growth. This life-cycle mechanism, however, has not fared well empirically. For
example, careful analysis of the implications of the life-cycle hypothesis has led Hayashi (1986) to
reject it as a plausible theory of Japan￿ s high saving behavior during its high growth period.20
19For example, in a two-period life-cycle model where the income in the retirement period is zero, the aggregate




1+￿ g, which is zero if ￿ g = 0 and increases monotonically with ￿ g. For a recent literature
review on the life-cycle model and the growth-saving puzzle, see Modigliani and Cao (2004).
20The life-cycle hypothesis has also gained little support from Chinese data (see, e.g., Horioka and Wan, 2007;
Chamon and Presad, 2010). The empirical failure of the life-cycle model in explaining the positive growth-saving
relationship has pushed the literature to search for alternative explanations, such as habit formation (Carroll and
Weil, 1994), high TFP growth (Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu, 2006), and rising income and health care risks
(Chamon and Presad, 2010; Chamon, Liu, and Presad, 2010).
15Proposition 3 The saving rate ￿ is a hump-shaped (inverted-U) function of income growth, in-
creasing in ￿ g if ￿ g < ￿ g￿ and decreasing in ￿ g if ￿ g > ￿ g￿, where the threshold ￿ g￿ 2 (0;1) is strictly
positive and bounded from above.
Proof. See Appendix A.III.
For example, when ￿ g = 0, we have ￿ = 0 and d￿
d￿ g > 0, as in a typical life-cycle model. By
continuity, the saving rate increases with income growth for small values of ￿ g. This proposition
shows that higher income growth can lead to a higher saving rate instead of a higher marginal
propensity to consume, in sharp contrast to the prediction of the PIH. The PIH predicts that
forward-looking consumers should increase their marginal propensity to consume when they expect
income to be permanently higher in the future. However, with uninsured uncertainty and borrowing
constraints, this prediction is no longer necessarily correct when the growth rate of income is below
a threshold level (￿ g￿).
The PIH is based on two critical assumptions: (i) Agents are able to consume their future income
by borrowing, and (ii) agents do not face any uninsured risk. However, with borrowing constraints
and uninsured risk, people are not able to consume their future income and they need to keep a
bu⁄er stock as self-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks.21 The key insight of Proposition 2 is that
under borrowing constraints and uninsured risk, the optimal saving rate will increase with income
growth for empirically plausible growth rates, consistent with much of the empirical evidence.22
It is important to reiterate the intuition. Since saving provides liquidity, it yields a liquidity
premium R (shadow rate of return). Because the degree of risk remains constant relative to the
growth trend, savings can serve e⁄ectively as a bu⁄er stock if and only if the stock-to-income ratio
remains su¢ ciently high. However, since income is a ￿ ow, a higher income growth rate will lead
to a lower stock-to-income ratio if the saving rate remains unchanged. Consequently, the liquidity
premium will increase with ￿ g, and a higher liquidity premium will induce a higher saving rate.
On the other hand, if the growth rate is su¢ ciently high, then the opportunity cost of not
consuming the rapidly growing income outweighs the bene￿ts of precautionary savings, causing the
optimal saving rate to decline with growth (as predicted by the PIH). This hump-shaped concave
saving function is dictated by a bounded liquidity premium R. Note that the function R(￿) is
bounded above by E￿
￿ > 1. To see this, recall that ￿￿
2 = ￿￿
1 + 2￿R￿1 > ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿ (where ￿ is the lower
bound of the support in the distribution) and that R is decreasing in ￿￿
1. So the maximum value
21That is, with uninsured risks, having a binding borrowing constraint by setting st+1(i) = 0 for all t is not optimal.
22See, for example, Modigliani (1970), Carroll and Weil (1994), Modigliani and Cao (2004), Horioka and Wang
(2007), among many others.
16of R is given by





























Thus, there exists a maximum value of the growth rate ￿ gmax =
￿
1+￿R(￿) ￿ 1 > ￿ g￿ such that if
￿ g ￿ ￿ gmax, R can no longer increase. In this case, the borrowing constraint (5) becomes binding for
all households and nobody saves. Hence, the saving function ￿(￿ g) must be hump-shaped, increasing
with ￿ g ￿rst and then decreasing with ￿ g for ￿ g ￿ ￿ g￿ > 0, and approaching zero as ￿ g ! ￿ gmax.
Calibration. For a quantitative picture of the saving behaviors in the model, consider the
following calibration exercise. The parameter a in the utility function has no e⁄ect on the saving
rate, so we normalize a = 1. Let the time period t be a year and set ￿ = 0:96. For tractability, we
assume ￿ follows the Pareto distribution,
F(￿) = 1 ￿ ￿￿￿; (22)
with ￿ > 1 and ￿ 2 (1;1). A value of ￿ = 1 may indicate a life-threatening medical need, but
the probability of such events is in￿nitely small or zero.23 The results remain robust to alternative
distributions, such as lognormal and uniform distributions. With Pareto distribution, we have

















j , and H(￿￿
j) = 1￿D(￿￿
j).
We assume p = 0:5, so that the average bonus income is zero for all households. This also
implies that the income shock is symmetric around a zero mean. We set ￿ = 2 to match the income
inequality in China. However, the results are not sensitive to the value of ￿, suggesting that income
shocks are not essential for our results (Figure 3). The parameter ￿ = 1:3 in the Pareto distribution
is estimated by the method of moments (to be discussed in the next section). The parameter values
are summarized in Table 1.
With the calibrated parameter values, the relationship between the aggregate household saving
rate (￿) and the growth rate (￿ g) is graphed in Figure 3 (the line with circles). It shows (quanti-
tatively) the two important predictions of the model discussed previously. First, a higher income
growth leads to a higher saving rate even if the real rate of return to saving is negative (
￿
1+￿￿1 < 0).
For example, when the income growth rate is 1% per year, the saving rate is 6:5%. When the income
growth rises to 10% per year, the saving rate increases to 22%, a more than 15 percentage-point
increase.
23The absence of an upper bound on preference shock is assumed only for simplicity; an upper bound can be
incorporated in the analysis without qualitatively changing the main results.
17Figure 3. Saving Rate as a Function of Growth.
Second, the saving function is hump-shaped (i.e., inverted-U-shaped). Under the current cali-
bration, the function will reach a maximum at the growth rate ￿ g￿ = 24 percent per year. The saving
rate becomes ￿ at beyond ￿ g￿ = 0:24 and declines slowly with ￿ g. The saving rate will eventually
approach zero as ￿ g increases to gmax. This suggests that unless the growth rate exceeds 24% per
year, the saving rate will always be positively associated with growth. Moreover, even if the growth
rate is greater than 24% per year, the saving rate can still remain at very high levels. For example,
the saving rate remains at 23% even when the income growth rate is as high as 40% per year.24
Such an inverted-U-shaped saving function di⁄erentiates the in￿nite-horizon, incomplete-market
model from the life-cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954). Since the life-cycle model
relies exclusively on an aggregation e⁄ect to generate the positive growth-to-saving relationship, its
implied aggregate saving rate will increase without bound as the growth rate approaches in￿nity,
in sharp contrast to the implication of this in￿nite-horizon model.
24When idiosyncratic risks in the model are gradually reduced to zero, the hump of the saving function will shift to
the left and eventually disappear. For example, suppose the variances of income and preference shocks are tiny (with
￿ = 0:00001 and ￿ = 15), the saving rate not only is very low (about 0:003% when income growth rate is 1% per
year), but also declines rapidly to zero when income growth reaches 2:8% per year. That is, there is no need to save
when uninsured risks are minimal. In this case, trade is always balanced. It can also be shown that the home country
will run trade de￿cits with the rest of the world if there are no borrowing constraints (but with positive growth),
consistent with the prediction of the PIH. Therefore, our model includes the PIH as a special (limiting) case.
18If the foreign asset (m) is not liquid (i.e., cannot be adjusted instantaneously to bu⁄er idiosyn-
cratic shocks), then its rate of return must be higher than the discounted growth rate (￿
1+￿ g
￿ ) to
induce entrepreneurs to hold it. For example, if the growth rate is 10% per year and the discounting
factor is ￿ = 0:96, then any illiquid asset with a rate of return less than 14% per year will have
a zero demand and, in such a case, trade is always balanced. This explains why China￿ s foreign
reserves are predominantly low-yield liquid foreign bonds.
The line with triangles in Figure 3 represents the case without income shocks (i.e., ￿ = 0).
It shows that income risk is not quantitatively important in generating the high saving rates in
our model. This result is similar to that obtained by Krusell and Smith (1998) who showed in a
neoclassical growth model with incomplete markets that labor income risk is not as important as
preference shocks in explaining the income and wealth inequalities in the United States.
Proposition 4 Without income shocks (￿ = 0), hours worked for each entrepreneur (Nt(i)) are









if ￿ g < ￿ gmax and ￿ N = a if
￿ g ￿ ￿ gmax.
Proof. See Appendix A.IV.
With income shocks (￿ > 0), hours worked are still bounded above by a ￿xed number. However,
whether N(i) ￿ 0 is satis￿ed depends on the variance of income shocks and the other parameter
values of the model. Numerical analysis indicates that under our current calibration in Table 1,
Nt(i) may hit the lower bound 0 or become negative occasionally but the probability (frequency)
is too small to quantitatively a⁄ect our results.
3.2 Saving Along a Stochastic Growth Path
China￿ s economic growth rate may not stay at 10% forever. If the high growth rate is transitory
instead of permanent, then the corresponding saving rate would be much larger in the calibrated
model. The intuition is simple: If entrepreneurs are already willing to increase their saving when
facing a permanently higher income growth rate, the incentive to save is even stronger (because of
consumption-smoothing motives) when the higher income growth is transitory.
This can be illustrated easily by impulse response analysis. Our model permits closed-form
solutions even if the income growth rate is stochastic; hence, dynamic impulse response functions
can be expressed analytically. Suppose aggregate technology grows according to the stochastic









1 + ￿ g
￿
+ "t; (23)
19where ￿ g ￿ 0 is the mean and "t is an i.i.d. normally distributed process with zero mean. To
compute the stochastic equilibrium path of the model, we rescale all variables (except Nt) by the
level of technology At￿1; we use At￿1, instead of At, as the scaling factor so that the transformed
stock variable mt remains as a state variable that does not respond to changes in At in period t.25
Using lowercase letters to denote the transformed variables, xt ￿ Xt
At￿1, the production function
becomes yt = (1 + gt)Nt, the real wage becomes wt = 1+gt, and the aggregate household resource
constraint becomes
ct + (1 + gt)mt+1 = mt + (1 + gt)Nt: (24)
Once the equilibrium decision rules and the dynamic paths of the stationary model are solved, we
can then uncover the original level variables by the inverse transformation: Xt ￿ xtAt￿1.
Proposition 5 In a stochastic dynamic equilibrium, the year-to-year changes in foreign reserves
are given by



























which is proportional to total nominal exports P￿
t Yt with a time-varying saving rate ￿t.
Proof. See Appendix A.V.
For example, suppose the stochastic growth rate gt is i.i.d. with ￿g = 0 and the steady-state
growth rate is 5% per year. The impulse response function of the saving rate to an unexpected
5-percentage-point increase in income growth is plotted in the left panel in Figure 4, where the
unexpected change in growth rate takes place in the 11th period. It shows that an unexpected
jump in the rate of income growth from 5% to 10% raises the saving rate from 21% to 33%, a
dramatic 12-percentage-point increase. In contrast, if this jump in income growth were permanent,
the saving rate at the new steady state (with 10% income growth per year) would be just 26% (as
shown in Figure 3 and the right panel in Figure 4). So the additional saving rate brought by the
higher income growth is only 6 percentage points under a permanent growth shift instead of the 12
percentage points under a transitory change in the growth rate. Notice that the transitory change
in the saving rate would be negative (instead of positive) in a standard PIH model without ￿nancial
frictions, because a temporarily higher income growth is equivalent to a permanent increase in the
income level.
25The particular methods of transformation do not a⁄ect the dynamics of the original variables.
20Figure 4. Impulse Responses of Saving Rate to Growth Rate Shock.
4 Predicting China￿ s Trade Imbalance and Foreign Reserves
Data show that between 1978 and 2009, China￿ s current account surplus increased dramatically,
reaching $426 billion (USD) in 2008. The bulk of the increase in the current account is due to
a rapidly rising trade surplus. Associated with the rising current account is the massive buildup
of China￿ s foreign reserves. In our model, trade surplus is determined by entrepreneurs￿precau-
tionary saving in the tradable-goods sector. Because of uninsured risks and borrowing constraints,
a substantial fraction of income earned from exports is saved, which leads to imbalances between
exports and imports. Most importantly, the precautionary saving rate rises with the growth rate
of income. When the growth rate of income is stochastic, so is the saving rate.
To calibrate the stochastic process fgtg in the model, the data for aggregate exports, the price
de￿ ator, and hours worked in the tradable-goods sector are needed. The growth rate of nominal













t￿1. Since data for the price de￿ ator (1 + ￿t) and hours worked (Nt) in the
tradable-goods sector are not available and since TFP growth typically mimics output growth, we
21follow the methodology in Durdu, Mendoza, and Terrones (2007) by approximating the growth
rate of technology in the tradable-goods sector by the growth rate of total exports adjusted by a
constant in￿ ation rate.26 With the estimated growth rate process fgtg in hand and assuming that
gt follows equation (23), then the mean growth ￿ g, the autocorrelation ￿g, and the variance ￿2
g can
all be estimated.
Notice that when gt is i.i.d. (i.e., ￿g = 0), the cuto⁄s f￿￿
1t;￿￿
2tg are constant and the implied
saving rate (￿t) based on equation (25) will be highly contemporaneously correlated with gt because
@R(￿￿)
@￿￿ < 0. On the other hand, if gt is serially correlated (as in the data), then the cuto⁄s are time
varying and the implied saving rate will be positively correlated with not only the current gt but
also the lagged gt because high growth in the last period also tends to induce high saving in the
current period.
Using Chinese data for nominal exports (measured in USD) for the 1978-2009 period, the
estimated mean nominal growth rate is ￿ g = 0:17. With an average in￿ ation rate of 4% in the
U.S., the real growth rate of the export income is about 13% per year. This estimate of real
average TFP growth is also consistent with the empirical studies on Chinese manufacturing ￿rms
by Brandt, Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2009).27 Data suggest that the AR(1) coe¢ cient ￿g = 0:18
and the variance of the residual ￿2
" = 0:012.
Table 1. Parameter Values
^ ￿ ^ ￿ ^ g ￿ ￿ ^ ￿g ^ ￿2
" p ￿ ￿
0.96 1.3 0.13 0.17 0.012 0.5 2.0 0.04
We ask whether the model is able to explain both the business cycle features and the growth
trends of China￿ s trade surplus and foreign exchange reserves. To this end, we estimate the key
structural parameters by minimizing the distance between the time series implied by the model
and the data. The parameter ￿ cannot be estimated precisely, suggesting that income uncertainty
is not as important as expenditure uncertainty in explaining the data. That is, setting ￿ = 0 gives
essentially identical results in our model (e.g., see Figure 3), indicating that bonus income shocks
are not essential for our results. However, since we also want the model to be consistent with
the income and consumption distributions in China, we set ￿ = 2 to match the Gini coe¢ cient of
household income in China.






are reestimated using the method of moments. That is, we take only the
26We assume a 4% annual in￿ ation rate but the results are not sensitive to this value.
27Brandt et al. (2009, Figure 2) report that the average TFP growth rate for manufacturing ￿rms in China is about
9.6% for 1999-2006 and 13-14% for 2002-2006. Given that exporting ￿rms are among the most productive enterprises
in China, our estimate of a 13% real output growth rate is credible.





so that the model
can best match the time-series data of total exports and the changes in foreign reserves in China.
The estimated parameter values are reported in Table 1 and denoted by circum￿ ex. It shows that
the estimated values under the method of moments,
￿




identical to their original values in the raw data. The estimated value of ^ ￿ = 0:96 is also identical
to standard calibrations in the literature.
Figure 5. Predictions of Total Exports (left) and Changes in Foreign Reserves (right).
Under these parameter values, the predicted total exports income (P￿
t AtNt) and year-to-year
changes in foreign reserves (Mt+1￿Mt) in the model are shown in the left and right panels in Figure
5, respectively, where the solid lines in each panel represent data and dashed lines are predictions.28
Despite having only a single aggregate shock, the model explains more than 90% of the data (e.g.,
the R2 implied by ordinary least squares is 0:99 for total exports and 0:93 for exchange reserves).
In particular, the model tracks the surge in total exports and foreign reserves since 2002 quite well
(China joined the WTO in December 2001), mainly because stochastic changes in productivity
growth can generate large swings in the saving rate along a transitional path. The model also
tracks well the 2009 slump due to the recent U.S. ￿nancial crisis.29
28Labor (Nt) is predicted using equation (51) in Appendix A.V.
29The prediction for net exports is similar to that of foreign-reserve changes, as the two variables are equivalent in
23The model can track China￿ s trade surplus and foreign reserves well because income growth
drives saving in the model. Hence, the saving rate (changes in foreign reserves or net exports)
in the model can closely trace both the large acceleration in export income after China joined
the WTO and the sharp decline in export income during the 2008 ￿nancial crisis. Both events
have signi￿cantly changed the export sector￿ s saving rate in the same direction. This result is
reminiscent of the ￿ndings in Chen et al (2006), who show that aggregate income growth was the
fundamental driving force behind movements in Japan￿ s aggregate saving rate. However, their
results are obtained under the assumption that high TFP growth leads to a higher real interest
rate, which in turn stimulates household savings. In contrast, we generate the positive link between
entrepreneurial saving and income growth despite the constant (negative) real interest rate.
In addition to matching the time series of trade surplus and foreign reserves, the model is also
consistent with measures of income and expenditure inequality in China. For example, a large
body of the empirical literature reports that the Gini coe¢ cient for income distribution in China
is around 0:4-0:45 (see, e.g., Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles, 2006). There are fewer studies on the
distribution of consumption expenditures in China. One exception is the work by Xing, Fan, Luo,
and Zhang (2009). Based on data from three villages in southwest China, these authors report
a consumption Gini coe¢ cient around 0:33-0:38 and an income Gini coe¢ cient around 0:42. The
model-implied consumption Gini is 0:36 and income Gini is 0:42.
Despite the good match between our model and the data, we cannot claim that rapid income
growth and ine¢ cient ￿nancial system are the only explanatory factors for China￿ s trade surplus
and excessive foreign reserves. The quantitative results simply suggest that these two factors are
important in understanding China￿ s high saving rate and trade imbalance without resorting to
a linked exchange rate and undervalued home currency. Our story does not eliminate or exclude
other contributing factors. For example, in addition to precautionary saving motives, a competitive
saving behavior due to an imbalanced sex ratio in China could also be partially responsible for the
rising household saving rate in China (Wei and Zhang, 2011). The export sector￿ s corporate savings
may have also played a role in China￿ s trade surplus and foreign-reserve buildups (Sandri, 2010;
and Buera and Shin, 2010). However, the high corporate saving rate in China is mostly absorbed
by ￿rms￿high investment rate; rather, it is the large pool of household savings that has been
unable to ￿nd its way to productive ￿rms due to an ine¢ cient state-owned banking system. This
explains why China￿ s trade surplus is positively correlated with household saving rate but not with
corporate saving rate (see Jin, 2011).30
the model and behave similarly in the data.
30Appendix B shows that introducing ￿xed capital investment and a nontradable-goods sector into the model does
not change the main results.
245 Explaining the Paradoxical Growth-Saving Causal Relations
The empirical literature documents two puzzling and mutually con￿ icting facts about household
saving behaviors: (i) Lagged income growth is a signi￿cant and the single most important factor in
explaining the high household saving rate (e.g., Modigliani and Cao, 2004) and (ii) future income
growth is often negatively correlated with the current household saving rate (e.g., Kraay, 2000).
The ￿rst fact is inconsistent with the PIH that predicts not only that a higher income growth
should lead to a lower saving rate, but also that households are forward looking. However, the data
indicate not only that households save more when their incomes grow faster, but also that they are
backward looking. The second fact seems to contradict the ￿rst and supports the PIH because it
indicates that households reduce current saving when they expect to be richer in the future. The
greater puzzle is that the same data set yields these two opposite implications.
Both facts are predicted by our model. Under uninsured risk and borrowing constraints, optimal
consumption policy appears myopic, depending only on the current level of a target wealth. How-
ever, the target wealth (xt) depends on past savings (st), which in turn depend on the past income
growth rate (gt￿1). In addition, because consumption (ct) and the current savings (mt+1) are both
proportional to the target wealth xt, the changes in savings (mt+1 ￿ mt) are then determined by
both current and lagged income growth instead of future income growth. This implies that move-
ments in the saving rate will lag movements in the income growth rate. Therefore, past income
growth is a good predictor of the current saving rate but not vice versa. This also implies that if
income growth is serially correlated over the business cycle, then higher future income growth will
appear to indicate a lower current saving rate because saving lags income growth.
To quantitatively illustrate the lead-lag relations between income growth and the saving rate,




t=1 from the model. The sample size is
T = 10;000. The growth rate is generated according to the lognormal law of motion in equation
(23) and the saving rate is generated based on the saving function in equation (25). The parameters
are based on Table 1. Based on the simulated time series, we then estimate the following equation
by ordinary least squares (OLS):
￿t = ￿0 + ￿gt￿J + e￿t ; J = f1;2;￿1;￿2g: (27)
The estimated values of ￿ are reported in Table 2 (standard error SD is in parentheses).
Table 2. OLS Estimation of Equation (27)
￿g = 0:17 ￿g = 0:5
J 1 2 ￿1 ￿2 1 2 ￿1 ￿2
￿ 0.788 0.133 0.023 ￿0.000 1.430 0.716 ￿0.307 ￿0.145
SD (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
R2 0.998 0.030 0.001 0.000 0.461 0.114 0.021 0.005
25The left panel of Table 2 shows that lagged income growth (either with a one-period lag or a two-
period lag) signi￿cantly predicts the current saving rate, consistent with the ￿ndings of Modigliani
and Cao (2004). The OLS coe¢ cient is 0.788 with an extremely high R2 of 0.988 when the lag
length J = 1. In the case of a two-period lag (J = 2), the coe¢ cient is substantially reduced to
0.133 but still highly signi￿cant with a SD of 0.002. In sharp contrast, future income growth with
a one-period lead (J = ￿1) has only a very weak explanatory power on current saving rate (the
coe¢ cient is 0:023). Future income growth with a two-period lead (J = ￿2) has zero power in
explaining the current saving rate and the coe¢ cient tends to be negative.
This paradoxical pattern of growth-saving relations implied by the model can be further en-
hanced if we increase the serial correlation of the income growth rate from ￿g = 0:17 to ￿g = 0:5,
for example. The right panel in Table 2 shows that when ￿g = 0:5, past income growth remains
signi￿cant in predicting future saving. More importantly, future income growth rates (either with
a one-period lead or a two-period lead) are all negatively (and signi￿cantly) associated with the
current saving rate, consistent with the empirical ￿ndings of Kraay (2000).
Therefore, a negative association between future income growth and current saving does not
necessarily imply that the PIH holds. On the other hand, a positive association between past
income growth and future saving does not necessarily imply that households are not rational either.
Our model suggests that these seemingly paradoxical relationships can arise simultaneously￿ not
because people are irrational but because they face constraints (incomplete ￿nancial markets and
borrowing limits) not taken into account by the conventional PIH framework.
6 Caveats about Parameter Values (Not For Publication)
To capture China￿ s salient features of labor market and also to achieve analytical tractability, we
have made two crucial assumptions in the model: (i) quasi-linear utility with predetermined hours
and (ii) i.i.d. idiosyncratic shocks. A quasi-linear utility with predetermined supply of hours
implies that forward-looking entrepreneurs can adjust their labor supply to target an optimal level
of net worth only in advance based on the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks or anticipated changes
in income and spending needs. As a result, when the idiosyncratic shocks are i.i.d., all households
will choose the same level of targeted net worth (or cash on hand, xt) in the beginning of each
period before idiosyncratic shocks are realized, regardless of their initial asset holdings (mt￿1(i)).
This property is key for yielding closed-form solutions at both the household and the aggregate
levels, so the model can be solved by pencil and paper.31
31Comparing to ￿nancial frictions, the assumption of an elastic labor supply (at the aggregate level) is not as
important for our main results although it is technically crucial for obtaining closed-form solutions.
26If the idiosyncratic shocks are serially correlated, closed-form solutions are no longer possible,
yet we expect our results to be quantitatively similar (or even enhanced rather than weakened).
In particular, the precautionary saving rate may be even higher with serially correlated shocks,
everything else equal. Suppose shocks are highly persistent, a positive shock to spending needs
(or a negative shock to bonus income) would signal a long period of high demand for bu⁄er-stock
saving relative to income. This would raise the optimal saving rate. The converse is true under
a negative preference shock (or a positive income shock), which would reduce the saving rate.
However, because the utility function is concave in consumption, agents are thus risk averse. This
implies that a persistent decline in consumption in a bad state outweighs a persistent increase in
consumption in a good state, especially when people are borrowing constrained in a bad state.
This asymmetric implication for welfare would result in a higher steady-state saving rate so that
households have an adequate bu⁄er against persistent shocks.
These caveats notwithstanding, it is well known that it is impossible for a model with i.i.d.
idiosyncratic shocks to simultaneously match both the income distribution across households and
the overtime volatility of income for each household. Cross-sectional variance and cross-time vari-
ance are di⁄erent statistics but they happen to be identical under i.i.d shocks. Typically, the Gini
coe¢ cient is about 2 to 3 times larger than the overtime variance of income (or consumption) in
developed countries. For example, the U.S. household income Gini is about 0:52 to 0:55 while the
variance of household income over time is about 0:23 (DeBacker et al., 2010). Therefore, while
our model matches the cross-household dispersions (inequalities) in income and consumption, it
may have overstated the true risks facing Chinese households. However, the following discussions
explain why this is not the case for China.
i) The Gini coe¢ cient in China reported in the existing empirical literature may be signi￿cantly
understated for several reasons. China￿ s income Gini is reported to be 0:45 in 2004, which is
signi￿cantly smaller than that in the United States in 2006 (0:55 for pretax household income and
0:52 for post-tax household income).32 According to Flannery (2009), China￿ s top 400 richest people
are worth $314 billion, which is just one-fourth the total net worth of their American counterparts.
On the other hand, the poorest group of people in the U.S. is likely to be 50 times richer than
their Chinese counterparts because the U.S. average hourly wage was $19 in 2010 while the hourly
wage in southern China cities was only about 75 cents an hour (New York Times, June 7, 2010),
this is a 25 fold gap. In addition, the income level in urban China is at least 3 times higher than
that in rural area. Thus, the reason for possible underestimations of Gini coe¢ cients in China is
the lack of sophisticated survey data with su¢ ciently large household samples that cover both rich
and poor Chinese households.33
32See, DeBacker et al. (2010).
33A recent study by Wang (2010) using rarely available government survey data in the countryside of east China
27ii) Measuring income risk is far more di¢ cult than measuring income inequality in China because
the former requires long time-series data to track family income changes. In particular, the existing
short panel data in particular cannot provide accurate information about the true income risk in
China. For a country such as China with a well-known volatile history, at least 50 to 75 years
of time-series data are needed to correctly gauge the volatility of household income. China has
experienced dramatic social and political turbulences and revolutions in the past 100 years and the
most recent ones￿ the Great Famine in 1959-61 and the Cultural Revolution in 1966-76￿ took place
only 40 to 50 years ago. A correct measure of income risk must take these extraordinary events
into account because they re￿ ect people￿ s real experiences about income risk and sociopolitical risk
in life. Unfortunately, the best-available panel data in China start in the early 1990s (such as the
data used by Chamon and Prasad, 2010; and Chamon, Liu, and Prasad, 2010), which cover only
the most peaceful time in recent Chinese history, and even these best-available panel data cover
only a very small number (a few hundreds) of households in China. Such panel data are thus hardly
representative.
Alternatively, income risk can be associated with career opportunities or the probability of
changes in one￿ s income class or social status. Enormous economic opportunities in modern China
and the lack of legal and institutional protections of property rights mean that (i) ordinary people
can become suddenly rich and (ii) rich people can become suddenly poor (due to either business
failures or political reasons). For example, the business failure rate in China is about 23 times
larger that that in the U.S. In the period 1948-97, the average business failure rate in the U.S. was
0.6% (or 60 ￿rms exit per year per 10,000 ￿rms).34 In China in the period 1998-2006, the business
failure rate was 14% (or 1,400 ￿rms exit per 10,000 ￿rms per year).35
iii) Aside from income risk, a perhaps more important source of risk is expenditure uncertainty,
such as unexpected spending for housing, education, and health care, or unpredictable expenditures
related to accidents, property damages, and volatile ￿ uctuations in consumption goods prices. An
ideal proxy of spending risk would be the frequency of illness and the associated costs or accessibility
of medical services, but such data are either unavailable or highly inadequate in China. However, the
following statistics may provide partial information to gauge expenditure uncertainty or spending
risk in China relative to that in the United States.
a) The majority of Chinese people are not e⁄ectively covered by any health care insurance
system. Medical insurance coverage in rural China has been essentially nonexistent since economic
reform (Wang, Xu, and Xu, 2007). Even in urban China, only 39% of the urban population had
estimates that in 2009 the household income Gini is above 0:74 for family business income, 0:6 for wage income,
0:93 for property income, and 0.78 for transfer income. These estimates seem closer to truth than the majority of
estimates in the existing literature.
34The data are from the Department of Commerce (Census Bureau) and Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
35See Brandt and Zhang (2009).
28some limited form of medical insurance in 2003 (Xu, Wang, Collins, and Tang, 2007).
b) Medical costs have increased dramatically in China since the economic reform and privati-
zation of the health care system, far faster than the growth rate of income and general price level.
The degree of uncertainty involved in medicare costs is also extremely high.
c) The WHO reports that approximately 2 million people in the world died prematurely each
year from water and air pollution, and more than one-third of that ￿gure comes from China (Platt,
2007).
d) The risk related to car accidents in China is 24 to 35 times higher than in the U.S. In 2005,
the U.S. had about 247 millions cars on the road and about 42,000 people were killed; the ratio is
0:00017 death per car. In 2009, China had 62 millions cars on the road and 250,000 people were
killed; the ratio is 0:004 death per car.36 Therefore, tra¢ c accident-related risk is 23:5 times higher
in China than in the U.S. Even this is an underestimation because only a very small percentage of
the Chinese population owns automobiles. If the ownership rate in China were as large as the U.S.,
the accident rate would have been much higher. For example, China￿ s Guandong province has the
highest car ownership in China because it is economically more advanced than other provinces. In
2006, Guandong province had about 1.5 millions cars on the road and about 9,000 people were
killed. The death accident rate is 0:06 person per car, which is 35 times higher than in the U.S.37
e) The risk of work-related injuries in China is two orders of magnitude higher than in the U.S.
For example, according to an o¢ cial report from the U.S. Department of Labor (Solis and Main,
2011), the average annual incidence rate of fatal injuries in the U.S. mining industry is 0:026% (or
2.6 individuals per 1000 persons for the period 2005-09). According to Xing, Liu, Sun, and Zhang
(1996), the comparable incidence rate in China (for the period 1981-94) is about 15%. Alternatively,
if the accident rate is measured by the number of fatal injuries (death) per millions of tons of coal
output, the value is 0:02% in the U.S. but 4% in China. Therefore, the risk of work-related injuries
is 200 to 500 times higher in China than in the U.S.
These data and information regarding income risk and expenditure risk can easily place the
true degree of idiosyncratic uncertainty in China at a level a couple of orders of magnitude higher
than that in the U.S. A conservative back-of-the-envelope estimate suggests that both income and
expenditure risk in China are at least 25 to 30 times higher than in the U.S. In addition, China
lacks well-developed insurance markets, social safety nets, and bankruptcy laws, so household
and entrepreneurs must bear most of the risks themselves through self-insurance and bu⁄er-stock
savings.
36Data source: http://www.car-accidents.com.
37The o¢ cial number is 9,000 people killed (Wang, 2009). However, many analysts have repeatedly pointed out
that the actual number in China is at least three times larger than o¢ cial government reports (see, e.g., ). Therefore,
the true accident rate in Guangdong province may be more than 100 times higher than in the U.S.
29These back-of-the-envelope estimates of uninsured risks suggest that it is unlikely that our
model parameters have overstated the true degree of idiosyncratic risks in China. For example,
DeBacker et al. (2010) report that the overtime SD of U.S. male earnings (in logarithms) is
around 0:48. If we suppose that risk can be transmitted linearly in the model, multiplying this
number by 25 suggests that the true volatility of household income in China should be about
￿logy = 25 ￿ 0:48 = 12. In general, the variance of household consumption (in logarithms) is
about half of the variance of household income (see, e.g., Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante,
2009), so the implied consumption volatility of Chinese households should be about ￿logc = 6.
Alternatively, using PSID and CES data, Guvenen and Smith (2010) found that the estimated SD
of the idiosyncratic transitory component in household log income is ￿logy = 0:3.38 Multiplying
this number by 25 gives ￿logy = 7:5. If consumption is half as volatile as income, the implied
consumption volatility in China would be ￿logc = 3:75. On the other hand, based on parameter
calibrations in Table 1 and the simulated time-series samples used in Table 2, the implied SD of
log consumption in our model is ￿logc = 0:6.39 This value is only one-tenth to one-sixth of the
back-of-the-envelope estimates of consumption risk in China.
Finally, Appendices B and C (available upon request) and Wen (2011) provide further robustness
analyses to our results. Appendix B shows that our results continue to hold when capital investment
and a nontradable-goods sector are introduced into the benchmark model. In particular, it shows
that similar parameter values can imply a 42% investment rate (investment-to-GDP ratio) and a
46% national saving rate. Thus, China￿ s domestic investment rate is unable to fully absorb its
domestic savings despite the fact that it is one of the highest in the world.
Appendix C shows that capital controls and a linked exchange rate are not essential for China￿ s
trade surplus and foreign-reserve buildups. Rather, Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardian comparative advan-
tages in labor costs and productivity growth (i.e., a rapidly growing export income) and precau-
tionary saving due to an ine¢ cient ￿nancial system and underdeveloped insurance markets hold
the key. This implies that even if China appreciates the RMB dramatically against the dollar (or
adopts a ￿ exible exchange rate), its trade with the U.S. and the rest of the world will remain
imbalanced, everything else equal.40 This point is important because large trade surpluses and
38These authors assume that the transitory component of household income (in logarithms) follows an AR(1)
process, yt = ￿yt￿1 + et. The estimated value of persistence is ￿ = 0:75 and the estimated SD of the innovation is





39Because disposable income may take negative values in our model (due to negative bonus shocks), we are not
able to compute the variance of log income in the model.
40This prediction is consistent with data. The value of the Chinese yuan (RMB) has increased signi￿cantly in
recent years￿ more than 21% against the U.S. dollar since 2005. Nevertheless, U.S. trade de￿cits with China have
continued to increase since then. As of 2010, China overtook Japan to become the second-largest trading partner
(country) of the U.S., next only to Canada. Similarly, Japan￿ s massive trade surplus with the U.S. remains even after
dramatic appreciations of the yen against the dollar in the 1980s under U.S. pressure.
30foreign-reserve buildups are not unique to the Chinese economy. Other economies where capital
controls and a linked exchange rate are not necessarily universal features of emerging economies.
Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea also exhibited high household saving rates
and persistent trade surpluses during their respective rapid economic growth periods.41 Therefore,
it is desirable to show that our results do not hinge on the preconditions of capital controls or a
linked exchange rate, even though our modeling strategies respect such status quo in China as they
impose disciplines on the assumptions￿ or impose restrictions on the realisticness of the working
mechanisms￿ in the model (see discussions in the Introduction).
7 Relation to the Literature
The heterogeneous productivity structure of the exporting ￿rms in the model is based on Melitz
(2003).42 Incorporating tradable assets and borrowing constraints into a setting with heteroge-
neous exporters, where forward-looking entrepreneurs make production, consumption, and saving
decisions in a dynamic environment with both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainties, neces-
sarily increases the technical complexity of the Melitz model. In order to reduce this additional
complexity, we abstract from some of the ￿rm-level dynamics, such as entry and exist, ￿xed export
costs, and monopolistic competition, that are typically modeled in the recent trade literature. The
primary forces explaining the existence of imbalanced trade as an equilibrium phenomenon are
nevertheless quite intuitive. Large uninsured risks and severe borrowing constraints can generate
a strong precautionary demand for liquid assets (in both the tradable and nontradable-goods sec-
tors), which leads to current account surplus. Because the marginal propensity to save in such an
environment depends positively on income growth, the more ￿rms are able to export, the larger is
the trade imbalance.
This paper also relates to the literature on global ￿nancial imbalances, most notably works by
Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008); Mendoza, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2009); Ju and Wei
(2010); and Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011). Caballero et al. (2008) attempt to explain
the global imbalances in ￿nancial asset allocations as an equilibrium outcome of an economic
environment in which various regions of the world di⁄er in their capacity to generate ￿nancial
assets from real investments. They argue that fast growth in emerging economies, coupled with
their inability to generate su¢ cient local store-of-value instruments, would increase their demand
for saving instruments from the developed world. This leads to a rise in capital ￿ ows toward the
United States and an increase in the importance of American assets in global portfolios.
Mendoza et al. (2009) argue that persistent global imbalances and their portfolio composition
41Some of these economies later adopted a ￿ exible exchange rate regime, yet their trade surplus remained.
42Also see Eaton and Kortum (2002), BEJM (2004), and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
31could be the result of international ￿nancial integration among countries with heterogeneous do-
mestic ￿nancial markets. In particular, countries with more-advanced ￿nancial markets attract
￿nancial capital from less-developed countries by providing safe return assets while maintaining
positive net holdings of risky equity and FDI.
Ju and Wei (2010) document a very interesting and important stylized fact: Financial capital
tends to ￿ ow from poor to rich countries, whereas ￿xed capital tends to ￿ ow from developed to
developing countries. They study how domestic institutions can explain this pattern of two-way
international capital ￿ ows. They argue that an ine¢ cient ￿nancial system and poor corporate
governance may be bypassed by two-way capital ￿ ows in which domestic savings leave the country
in the form of ￿nancial capital out￿ ows but domestic investment occurs through inward FDI from
countries with more-e¢ cient ￿nancial systems and better corporate governance.
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011) provide a model of ￿nancial friction and resource reallo-
cation to explain China￿ s growth experience and economic transition, as well as its foreign-reserve
buildup. They argue that, because private ￿rms have higher productivity but limited access to ex-
ternal ￿nancing while state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have lower productivity but better access to
credit markets, resources are only gradually reallocated from ine¢ cient ￿rms to e¢ cient ￿rms dur-
ing the transition, generating sustained high returns to capital. On the other hand, the downsizing
of SOEs during the transition reduces aggregate demand for capital and forces the excess domestic
savings to be invested abroad, generating a foreign surplus. While their model is consistent with
the rising foreign surplus in China and provides an excellent framework for understanding China￿ s
economic transition through resource reallocation, it takes the saving rate in China as given and
generates capital out￿ ows through a declining domestic capital demand by SOEs.43
Aforementioned papers all emphasize ￿nancial frictions in creating the ￿nancial imbalance be-
tween domestic saving and domestic investment and rely on the accounting identity between capital
and current accounts to explain trade surpluses. However, by focusing on the saving-investment
imbalance alone, this literature falls short in explaining the large trade surplus in China because
capital controls in China make ￿nancial-capital out￿ ows impossible, as discussed in the introduction
of this paper.44 In addition, this literature either is unable to explain China￿ s high household saving
43Models that can generate domestic savings in excess of domestic capital demand also include Sandri (2008),
Buera and Shin (2010), Chamon, Liu, and Presad (2010), and Carroll and Jeanne (2009), among others. Sandri
(2008) and Buera and Shin (2010) argue that ￿nancial frictions and productivity growth in a developing country can
cause a larger increase in saving than in investment because borrowing constraints induce entrepreneurs not only
to self-￿nance investment but also to accumulate precautionary wealth outside their business enterprises. Using an
overlapping generations framework of precautionary savings due to increasing income (unemployment) risk, Chamon,
Liu, and Presad (2010) and Carroll and Jeanne (2009) show that income growth and an associated acceleration in
income (unemployment) risk can lead to a large buildup of domestic savings relative to domestic capital demand,
and hence out￿ ows of capital from developing countries to developed ones. In sharp contrast, this paper does not
rely on the assumption of increasing risk to explain the positive growth-saving relationship. Income (consumption)
risk is assumed to be constant in our model.
44Namely, Chinese ￿rms and households cannot purchase foreign assets with RMB, and the only way to obtain
large amount of dollars is through exports.
32rate and the positive growth-to-saving causality found in the data, or fails to take into account the
rapid income growth in China when deriving the saving-investment relations.45
Building on and complementing the existing literature, this paper considers several important
empirical issues not addressed previously and uses these issues to discipline our modeling strategies.
First, we aim to explain the positive relationship between high saving and high growth under low
interest rates without relying on the Modigliani-Brumberg (1954) demographic mechanism.46 We
believe that this positive growth-to-saving e⁄ect is critical in understanding China￿ s extraordinary
path of trade surplus and foreign-reserve buildups in recent decades, especially since joining the
WTO. Second, we would like our model to generate ￿nancial capital out￿ ows instead of ￿xed
capital out￿ ows, consistent with the empirical facts documented by Ju and Wei (2010). Third,
we take into account capital controls in China so that ￿nancial capital out￿ ows are the result
of imbalanced trade rather than the other way around. In addition, our model deals explicitly
with nominal foreign reserves, which requires properly modeling the micro-incentives behind the
demand for foreign currency or low-yield liquid foreign assets. This modeling strategy not only
enables us to discuss China￿ s foreign reserves in nominal terms but also opens the possibility of
addressing other interesting issues related to the nominal exchange rate. Instead of assuming cash-
in-advance constraints or money-in-the-utility function as in the standard international ￿nance and
monetary literature, this paper combines Bewley￿ s (1980) store-of-value function of money demand
with a bu⁄er-stock precautionary saving model to generate demand for money and nominal foreign
reserves.
Precautionary saving is a well-acknowledged factor contributing to high saving rates (e.g., Aiya-
gari, 1994). However, this paper shows that precautionary saving per se is not su¢ cient for quanti-
tatively explaining the excessively high saving rates of China and other emerging economies despite
large uninsured risks. Besides providing an analytically tractable model, a novel contribution of
this paper is it shows that rapid income growth can signi￿cantly enhance the rate of precautionary
saving in an in￿nite horizon model despite low interest rates and constant idiosyncratic risk.
Finally, this paper￿ s concept in explaining high saving through high income growth in an in￿nite-
horizon model is related to the work of Chen, Imrohoroglu, and Imrohoroglu (2006). These authors
use a standard neoclassical growth model to o⁄er a quantitative account of the time path of Japan￿ s
high national saving rate in the postwar period. Their analysis reveals that TFP growth is the main
force driving Japan￿ s high saving rate in the 1960-70s. However, their model requires a high real
interest rate (implied by the high marginal product of capital) to induce households to save. For
example, in their model the required real interest rate for households to save would be as high as
45High household-income growth may generate low household saving in these models.
46The cohort e⁄ect on the positive growth-to-saving relationship in a life-cycle model is rejected empirically by
many studies; see Hayashi (1986), Kraay (2000), Horioka and Wan (2007), and Chamon and Presad (2010), among
others.
3314 percent a year when the TFP growth rate is 10% per year and the time discounting factor is
0.96. But a real interest rate this high is rarely observed in Japanese or Chinese data (see an earlier
version of this paper (Wen, 2009a) for more discussions on this issue and the relevant data). In
contrast, our model can generate a high saving rate in a zero or even negative real interest rate
environment, which is consistent with the real-life scenario in China.47
8 Conclusion and Remarks for Future Research
This paper provides a simple, analytically tractable framework to understand China￿ s massive trade
imbalances and foreign-reserve buildups. Despite its simplicity, the model performs quite well in
qualitatively and quantitatively explaining the Chinese data. Our framework is disciplined by two
sets of important empirical facts: (i) China has a high income growth rate and a depressed (negative)
real interest rate, and (ii) China has capital controls and its large ￿nancial capital out￿ ow is the
consequence rather than the source of its current account surplus. These facts were the motivation
to (i) start with a trade model (that explicitly includes an export sector) and (ii) enrich the model
with the demand for low-yield liquid assets in a heterogeneous-agent framework with borrowing
constraints and uninsured risks.
Our analysis shows that China￿ s gargantuan foreign reserves can be a natural consequence
of rapid economic growth in conjunction with an ine¢ cient ￿nancial system (or lack of timely
￿nancial reform) that has hampered Chinese entrepreneurs from consuming their rapidly growing
future income. Speci￿cally, because of large uninsured risks and severe borrowing constraints, the
saving rate remains an increasing function of income growth even at relatively high growth rates.
Given the high growth rate of income, Chinese entrepreneurs (exporters) opt to save a substantial
fraction (more than a quarter) of their income earned from trade, which leads to the massive buildup
of China￿ s foreign reserves. Hence, China￿ s trade imbalance puzzle is resolved without appealing
to a hypothetically distorted exchange rate.48
The fundamental determinants of the exchange rate include not only excess demand for tradable
47See Appendix B for a model with capital investment that shows that a high national saving rate and investment
rate can be generated from high TFP growth despite a negative real interest rate.
48Even a layman can understand the following arithmetic: Suppose the real exchange rate between Chinese goods
and American goods is 1:1￿ for example, 1 Chinese orange for 1 American apple. Whenever China gives up N
oranges, it receives N American apples in return. Trade is therefore always balanced between the two countries
because the total value of Chinese exports (N oranges) always equals the value of imports (N apples). Suppose the
Chinese government is able to manipulate the real exchange rate so that Chinese workers must give up 100 oranges for
1 American apple. Despite the extremely cheap Chinese products with a real exchange rate of 100:1, trade between
the two nations is still balanced￿ for every 100 oranges China exports to the U.S., it receives 1 U.S. apple, so the
total value of Chinese exports (100￿N oranges) still equals the total value of Chinese imports (N American apples).
Therefore, trade can always be balanced regardless of the exchange rate. However, imbalanced trade could occur in
the following situation: Suppose Chinese workers gave up 100 oranges and received 1 U.S. dollar as payment, with
which they could buy 1 American apple. But instead of spending the entire dollar on American apples, Chinese
workers bought only half an American apple and kept the remaining 50c / as savings. In this case, China would incur
a trade surplus of 0:5 American apple, equivalent to lending 50 oranges to American consumers by holding 50c / as
IOUs. The question is why Chinese workers opt to do that? This question is answered in this paper.
34goods but also excess demand for tradable assets.49 Even though the home country in our model
runs a massive current account surplus, the supply of dollars in the local exchange market (P￿
t Yt)
always equals the total demand of dollars (P￿
t Ct + Mt+1 ￿ Mt) in our model. Hence, there is no
pressure for the home currency to appreciate. Therefore, trade imbalances between China and the
rest of the world need not be attributed to a linked exchange rate or a undervalued home currency.
This conclusion holds true even if entrepreneurs in our model do not want to use dollars as a
saving device because they can always opt to exchange the amount (Mt+1 ￿ Mt) in each period
with their government for home currency. In this case, the government would become the holder of
foreign reserves without a⁄ecting our results. Also, the government should have no fear of in￿ ation
even without sterilization because households will save, instead of spend, the home currency they
exchanged with the government.50
Some important issues about China￿ s patterns of trade and reserve buildups remain untouched
by this paper. First, this paper focuses on the source of China￿ s foreign reserves but does not
explicitly explain the optimal portfolio aspect of the reserves. Currently, the bulk of China￿ s for-
eign reserves are in U.S. government bonds. Why does the Chinese government not diversify its
portfolio better by investing in high-yield assets? It is noteworthy that foreign reserves held by the
government are owned by the private sectors since they stem from the private sectors￿precaution-
ary savings but are bought (borrowed) by the government through sterilization.51 Therefore, the
government is e⁄ectively holding the reserves on behalf of the private sectors and must stand ready
whenever the private sectors want to buy back the dollars sold to the government. This implies
that the reserves must be predominantly in the form of liquid assets.
Second, China does not necessarily incur a trade surplus with all of its major trading partners.
For example, in sharp contrast to the case of Sino-U.S. trade, China has been running large trade
de￿cits with Japan and South Korea in the past decade (see, e.g., Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum, 2007
and 2008). This is puzzling from the viewpoint of the global imbalance literature (e.g., Mendoza
et al. 2009) because Japan and Korea both have a far more advanced ￿nancial system than China,
yet China is not lending goods or having net capital out￿ ows to these major trading partners
despite its rapidly growing trading volumes with them. A noteworthy point is that for every dollar
49This simple point is often ignored by trade theories and by a large body of the existing literature arguing for the
appreciation of the RMB (see, e.g., Evenett, 2010; and Krugman, 2010).
50Our analysis suggests that gradual ￿nancial development in China will ultimately reduce household saving rate
and eliminate China￿ s trade imbalances with the developed world. Recent household data suggest that this mechanism
may be already taking e⁄ect.
51The Chinese government buys dollars from residents by issuing bonds to retrieve the local currency. This practice
(sterilization) enables the government to absorb dollars without increasing the supply of local currency when trade
surplus increases. O¢ cially, the government is also obligated to buy dollars from the private sector to maintain a
￿xed exchange rate. Thus, sterilization is equivalent (in outcome) to a situation where the Chinese government meets
the savings demands of its domestic residents by selling them Chinese government bonds and using the proceeds
to purchase foreign (especially U.S.) bonds. If the private sectors want to increase spending on foreign goods, in
principle they can exchange dollars back from the government by selling bonds. In this sense, the Chinese government
is functioning like a bank, enabling savers to deposit and invest their foreign income.
35Chinese exporters make in trading with the U.S., only one fourth is saved; the remaining 75c / is
not spent entirely on U.S. goods because Chinese entrepreneurs also need dollars to import raw
materials and intermediate goods from other countries to produce ￿nal consumption goods. Japan
and South Korea are the major suppliers of China￿ s intermediate goods and assembly parts. As
a result, Japan and South Korea have successfully transformed themselves from America￿ s ￿nal-
goods suppliers into China￿ s intermediate-goods suppliers through a Heckscher-Ohlin-Ricardian
mechanism of comparative advantage: They ship intermediate goods and assembly parts to China
and re-export them to the U.S. in the form of ￿nal goods. This roundabout export process can
signi￿cantly reduce labor and raw material costs.52 Therefore, theories of both international trade
(that deal with excess demand of tradable goods) and international ￿nance (that deal with excess
demand of tradable assets) must be combined to fully understand the patterns of the imbalanced
world trade. Hopefully, extending the simple incomplete-market model developed in this paper to a
multi-country general-equilibrium framework with tradable intermediate goods and assets, as well
as di⁄erentiated labor costs will explain the pattern of trade among the U.S., China, and China￿ s
Asian trading partners (such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan). Explicitly dealing with these issues is
beyond the scope of this paper, so they are left to future research.
52According to Gaulier, Lemoine, and ￿nal-Kesenci (2007), "Assembly and processing of imported inputs for re-
export account for about half of China￿ s foreign trade. These activities have been the most dynamic part of China￿ s
exports since the early 1990s and have allowed for their rapid diversi￿cation from textile to electronics. Assembly
and processing is responsible for China￿ s entire trade surplus with the US and Europe."
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41Appendix A
I. Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Denote x ￿ 1
1+￿m(i) + wN(i) as cash in hand net of bonus income, and f￿t(i);￿t(i)g
as the Lagrangian multipliers associated with equations (4) and (5), respectively. The ￿rst-order

















w0 + ￿(i); (30)
where equation (29) re￿ ects the fact that the labor supply must be determined before the realization
of ￿t(i) and vt(i) in each period. The optimal decision rules are characterized by a cuto⁄ strategy.
There exist two cuto⁄s f￿￿
1;￿￿
2g for preference shocks because income shock vt(i) takes two possible
values. In anticipation that the cuto⁄s are independent of i, consider two possible cases as follow:
Case A. m0(i) ￿ 0, ￿(i) = 0. In this case, the urge to consume is low, or the income shock is
high, or both. It is then optimal to save to prevent possible borrowing constraints in the future
when the urge to consume may be high or income may be low. Equation (30) then implies that the
shadow value of good
￿(i) =
￿




￿ ￿ ￿t: (31)
Equation (28) then implies that ct(i) = ￿(i)￿ ￿
￿1. The household budget constraint then implies
(1 + ￿ g)m0(i) = x(i) + v(i)w ￿ ￿(i)￿ ￿
￿1
t . The requirement m0(i) ￿ 0 then implies
￿(i) ￿ [x(i) + v(i)w] ￿ ￿t ￿ ￿￿; (32)
which de￿nes the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t. However, there are two sub-cases to consider.
Case A1: vt(i) = ￿￿. In this sub-case the cuto⁄ is given by
￿￿
1 ￿ [x(i) ￿ ￿w] ￿ ￿t; (33)
and this sub-case happens with probability 1 ￿ p.
Case A2: vt(i) = ￿. In this sub-case the cuto⁄ is given by
￿￿
2 ￿ [x(i) + ￿w] ￿ ￿t (34)
42and this sub-case happens with probability p. Because xt is determined before the realization of
vt(i), it is hence independent of vt(i). Equations (33) and (34) then together imply
￿￿
2t = ￿￿
1t + 2￿wt￿ ￿t > ￿￿
1: (35)
This implies that the agent adopts a lower cuto⁄ for preference shocks when income is low and a
higher cuto⁄ when income is high.
Case B. ￿(i) > 0 and m0(i) = 0. In this case, the urge to consume is high, or income is low,
or both. It is then optimal not to save. By the household budget constraint, we have c(i) =
x(i) + v(i)w. There are again two sub-cases.




Case B2: v(i) = ￿, equation (34) then implies c(i) = ￿￿
2￿ ￿
￿1









￿ ￿t: if v(i) = ￿
: (36)
Clearly, if ￿(i) > ￿￿






> 0; and if ￿(i) > ￿￿
2, equation






> 0. In either case, m0(i) = 0.
The above analyses imply that ￿t(i) takes three possible values as shown in equations (31) and
(36), depending on the joint realizations of ￿t(i) and vt(i) in period t. Hence, the expected value,
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result, the optimal cuto⁄s, f￿￿
1t;￿￿
2tg, are determined jointly by equations (37) and (35). Equation
(37) implies that the cuto⁄s are independent of i because ￿(i) and v(i) are both i.i.d. Hence,
equations (33) and (34) in turn imply that the optimal cash in hand (xt) is also independent of i
and can be written either as xt = ￿ ￿
￿1
t ￿￿
1t + ￿wt or as xt = ￿ ￿
￿1
t ￿￿
2t ￿ ￿wt. Given the values of ￿(i),
the decision rules of consumption are given by
￿(i)
￿(i) and the decision rules of saving are given by
(1 + g)m0(i) = x ￿ c(i).
II. Proof of Proposition 2.
43Proof. In the steady state, the aggregate variables satisfy m0 = m;x￿￿w = ￿￿
1wR, and x+￿w =
￿￿
2wR. So equation (16) can be rewritten as
(1 + g)m = [(1 ￿ p)￿￿
1H1 + p￿￿
2H2]wR: (38)
Since wN = x ￿ 1
1+￿m0 = ￿￿
1wR + ￿w, the disposable income can be written as
} = ￿￿
1wR + 2p￿w ￿
1













1 + 2p￿R￿1) ￿ 1




Since 2￿R￿1 = ￿￿
2 ￿ ￿￿
1, the saving rate can be rewritten as equation (19).
III. Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. Denoting ￿ H(g) ￿ [(1 ￿ p)￿￿
1H1 + p￿￿




= (1 ￿ p)￿￿
1 + p￿￿
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(1 + ￿ g)G ￿ 1
1+￿ ￿ H
i2 :
Notice that G = (1 ￿ p)￿￿
1 + p￿￿
2 > ￿ H = [(1 ￿ p)￿￿
1H1 + p￿￿
2H2] because the marginal propensity





> 0. However, the ￿rst






, is negative because ￿￿
jHj decreases more than Hj when g
44increases. This implies that d￿
d￿ g > 0 if ￿ g = 0 and d￿
d￿ g < 0 if ￿ g ! 1. Continuity implies there exists
a threshold ￿ g￿ 2 (0;1) that renders d￿
d￿ g = 0 when ￿ g = ￿ g￿. So it must be true that d￿
d￿ g > 0 if ￿ g < ￿ g￿
and d￿
d￿ g < 0 if ￿ g > ￿ g￿.
IV. Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. When ￿ = 0, there exists a unique cuto⁄ ￿￿. So equations (11) and (12) imply that the
optimal cash in hand is given by ￿￿wR(￿￿) = x ￿ m(i) + wN(i). Using the saving decision rule
in equation (10), the condition that N(i) > 0 then implies (1 + ￿ g)￿￿wR(￿￿) > (1 + ￿ g)m(i) =
wR(￿￿)maxf￿￿ ￿ ￿(i);0g. Since the maximum value of maxf￿￿ ￿ ￿(i);0g is ￿￿ ￿ 1 (recall the
support of ￿(i) 2 [1;1]), the above inequality is satis￿ed if
(1 + ￿ g)￿￿R(￿￿) > R(￿￿)[￿￿ ￿ 1], (42)
which is clearly true for any parameter values in the model. Hence, regardless of the realization
of preference shocks, the labor supply of each entrepreneur is strictly positive. On the other hand,
the condition that N(i) < ￿ N implies (1 + ￿ g)￿￿wR(￿￿) < maxf￿￿ ￿ ￿(i);0g + w ￿ N. This inequality
can be ensured if the function maxf￿￿ ￿ ￿(i);0g takes the smallest value, which is 0. Hence, the
above inequality is satis￿ed as long as
(1 + ￿ g)￿￿R(￿￿) < ￿ N: (43)
Based on equation (12), the above inequality is equivalent to the condition
(1+￿ g)2
￿ ￿￿ < ￿ N. Under
Pareto distribution, we have R(￿￿) = 1 + 1








￿ and the above inequality becomes











< ￿ N: (44)
Given that ￿ > 1, the LHS of the above inequality is increasing in ￿ g. Since there exists a maximum
value of the growth rate ￿ gmax =
￿￿
￿￿1 ￿ 1 such that if ￿ g ￿ ￿ gmax, we have ￿￿ = 1 and m(i) = 0 for
all i, and in this case wN(i) = c(i) and N(i) = a. Therefore, hours worked by each entrepreneur is







for ￿ g < ￿ gmax or by the ￿xed
number ￿ N = a for ￿ g ￿ ￿ gmax.
V. Proof of Proposition 5.
45Proof. When technology At is stochastic and follows the law of motion in equation (23), the
general equilibrium path of the rescaled benchmark model can be characterized by the set of
variables, fct;mt+1;￿￿
t;xt;Nt;g, which can be solved uniquely by the following system of equations:
ct = (1 ￿ p)D(￿￿
1t)(xt ￿ ￿wt) + pD(￿￿
2t)(xt + ￿wt) (45)
(1 + gt)mt+1 = (1 ￿ p)H(￿￿
1t)(xt ￿ ￿wt) + pH(￿￿








xt ￿ mt + wtNt + (2p ￿ 1)￿wt = ￿￿
1tR(￿￿
1t)wt + ￿wt; (48)
plus equation (24) and standard transversality conditions.




implicitly for the cuto⁄ ￿￿
t and the cuto⁄ ￿￿
2t = ￿￿
1t +2￿R￿1(￿￿
1t). Given the cuto⁄s, equations (45)
and (48) solve for the optimal consumption path as






1t)](1 + gt); (49)
and equations (46) and (48) solve for the optimal foreign reserves as






1t)](1 + gt): (50)
When p = 1
2, equation (48) implies wtNt = ￿￿
1tR(￿￿
1t)wt+￿wt￿mt, which in turn implies employment





















Therefore, year-to-year changes in foreign reserves in period t are given by

































Multiplying the lowercase variables on both sides of the above equation by At￿1 gives equation
(25).
46Using the law of motion in equation (23) and assuming lognormal distribution for "t with mean
zero and variance ￿2














1 + ￿ g
: (53)
With ￿ following the Pareto distribution F = 1 ￿ ￿￿￿, we have R(￿￿













, so the above equation solves for the cuto⁄s f￿￿
1t;￿￿
2tg in conjunction with equation
(13).
47Appendix B (Not for Publication)
The benchmark model does not have capital. Therefore, that model cannot directly answer the
broader question of why China￿ s high investment rate is unable to completely absorb its domestic
savings. Also, the benchmark model does not have nontradable goods. This appendix extends the
benchmark model to a more general setting with capital and a nontradable-goods sector.
There are two production sectors in the home country￿ a domestic sector (sector 1) that pro-
duces nontradable goods and an export sector (sector 2) that produces tradable goods. Because
of capital controls and an inconvertible home currency, residents of the home country cannot use
foreign currency earned from the export sector to purchase domestic goods and assets, nor can
they use income earned from the nontradable-goods sector to buy foreign goods and assets. In
other words, nontradable goods are purchased by home currency (RMB) and tradable goods are
purchased by foreign currency (USD). However, households in country H can bypass the capital
controls through working in both nontradable and tradable sectors. Therefore, despite the cap-
ital control, households are able to adjust their baskets of consumption goods for tradable and
nontradable goods by choosing an optimal mixture of hours worked in each sector.
Also because of capital controls, ￿rms in the domestic sector must use income earned from
domestic sales to rent capital from a domestic rental market, while ￿rms in the export sector can
use foreign income to rent capital from an international market with a constant world real interest
rate ￿ rw. Fixed capital is not mobile across sectors but labor is. This setup of segregated capital
markets not only captures the reality in China (such as large capital adjustment costs, irreversible
investment, the lack of a resale capital goods market, and so on), but also allows the model to
generate the Ballasa-Samuelson e⁄ect of technology growth on the real exchange rate even though
the rate of productivity growth in both the nontradable-goods and tradable-goods sectors is the
same (see Wen, 2009a, for more discussions on the determination of the exchange rate and the
Ballasa-Samuelson e⁄ect).




where At denotes a country￿ s aggregate technology level with a stochastic growth rate speci￿ed in
equation (23). The demands for capital and labor in sector j are given by










Wjt = (1 ￿ ￿)
Yjt
Njt








r2t = ￿ rw (57)
is a constant world interest rate in the international rental market.
Labor mobility across sectors implies ￿1tW1t = ￿2tW2t, where ￿jt denotes the marginal utility
of income received from sector j. Hence, the real price of tradable goods in terms of nontradable
goods￿ the real exchange rate in the economy￿ is given by et ￿
￿2t
￿1t = W1t









Hence, the real exchange rate is in￿ uenced by aggregate technology shocks through changes in the
domestic real interest rate. In particular, a higher productivity growth leads to a higher domestic
interest rate, which implies that nontradable goods become more expensive relative to tradable
goods, so the real exchange rate appreciates (et decreases). This captures the Ballasa-Samuelson
e⁄ect in an environment with identical productivity growth across tradable and nontradable-goods
sectors.
Along a balanced growth path, the real wages fW1t;W2tg and outputs fY1t;Y2tg in both sectors
all grow at the rate of long-run productivity growth (￿ g) in the absence of aggregate uncertainty
("t = 0), while hours worked in both sectors are constant over time. To facilitate the analysis of
a stochastic equilibrium path under aggregate uncertainty, we rescale all variables in the model
by the level of technology At￿1 except for hours worked. Using lowercase letters to denote the
transformed variables, zjt ￿
Zjt
At￿1, the production functions become




and the real wages become
wjt = (1 ￿ ￿)
yjt
Njt







Households. As in the benchmark model, there is a continuum of households in country H
indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Each household has two members (husband and wife); one works in the
nontradable-goods sector and the other works in the tradable-goods (exporting) sector. Each
household consumes two types of goods: nontradable goods produced at home and foreign goods
produced abroad.
Households put their domestic savings in banks and earn a real gross rate of return 1 + ra
t .
Households exchange their foreign savings (in dollars) with the government for government bonds
49(sterilization). For simplicity and without loss of generality, assume that government bonds yield
zero interest rate. Therefore, in the model it does not matter whether the households hold dollars
or local government bonds. As documented by Wen (2009a), ￿nancial repression in China leads
to a low and even negative real deposit rate for household savings. Despite this, however, the
bulk of household wealth is kept in the form of bank deposits because of underdeveloped ￿nancial
markets in China. On the other hand, ￿rms must borrow funds from monopolistic state-owned
banks at market interest rate rt. To capture this reality, we assume that the real rate of return to
household savings is zero (ra = 0), and state-owned banks earn monopoly pro￿ts (rt ￿ ra)st, which
are returned in a lump sum to households. We will show that households in both sectors still save
excessively despite the low real deposit rate, as in the benchmark model.
Let st(i) ￿
St(i)
At￿1 denote the rescaled home asset and mt(i) ￿
Mt(i)
At￿1P￿
t the rescaled real money
balances for foreign currency held by household i. Household i￿ s consumption for home goods is
denoted as c1t(i) ￿
C1t(i)
At￿1 , imported goods as c2t(i) ￿
C2t(i)
At￿1 , and hours worked in sector j as Njt(i).
For simplicity, assume P￿
t = P￿




￿t f￿t(i)[￿1 logc1t(i) + ￿2 logc2t(i)] ￿ N1t(i) ￿ N2t(i)g (61)
subject to
c1t(i) + (1 + gt)st+1(i) ￿ x1t(i) + vt(i)wt (62)
st+1(i) ￿ 0 (63)
c2t(i) + (1 + gt)mt+1(i) ￿ x2t(i) + vt(i)wt (64)
mt+1(i) ￿ 0; (65)
where vt(i) denotes idiosyncratic income shocks, x1t(i) is net wealth (cash in hand) in terms of
income earned in sector 1:
x1t(i) ￿ w1tN1t(i) + st(i) + ￿t; (66)
and x2t(i) is cash in hand in sector 2:
x2t(i) ￿ w2tN2t(i) + mt(i); (67)
where ￿t = r1t
R
st(i)di denotes average pro￿t income distributed from domestic banks. The
parameter ￿j in the preference controls the relative equilibrium size of the domestic and export
sectors.
Equation (62) is the budget constraint pertaining to domestic income, which state that total
real wage income earned from the nontradable-goods sector can be used to ￿nance consumption
50of nontradable goods (c1t) and the accumulation of home assets ((1 + g)s0 ￿ s) subject to the
borrowing constraint (63). Analogously, equation (64) denotes the budget constraints pertaining to
foreign income, which states that total real wage income earned from working in the tradable-goods
sector can be used to ￿nance purchases of foreign produced goods (c2t) and the accumulation of
foreign currency (real foreign reserves, (1 + g)m0 ￿ mt) subject to the borrowing constraint (65).
For simplicity, we have assumed that income shocks (vt(i)) are symmetric across the two sectors
with distribution given by equation (6).
Proposition 6 Denoting s1t ￿ st and s2t ￿ mt, the decision rules of consumption, savings, and


















[xjt + ￿wjt]; with probability p
(68)



















[xjt + ￿wjt]; with probability p
(69)
xjt = ￿jwjt￿￿
jltRt + ￿wjt; (70)
where the cuto⁄ variables ￿￿
jlt and ￿￿



































Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1.
These decision rules are similar to those in the benchmark model. However, the optimal cuto⁄s
in each sector￿ determined by equations (71) and (72)￿ may di⁄er across sector j because the real
wage may di⁄er across sectors (because of di⁄erent capital markets and real interest rates).
Denoting any aggregate variable zjt ￿
R
zjt(i)di, market clearing for the domestic capital market
implies
R
s1t(i)di = k1t. Hence, the general equilibrium path of the model can be characterized by






t=0, which can be solved
by the following system of 16 equations (assuming p = 0:5 so that the average bonus income in
each sector is zero, ￿ v = (2p ￿ 1)￿ = 0):
cjt = (1 ￿ p)D(￿￿
jlt)[xjt ￿ ￿wjt] + pD(￿￿
jht)[xjt + ￿wjt] (73)
(1 + gt)sjt+1 = (1 ￿ p)H(￿￿
jlt)[xjt ￿ ￿wjt] + pH(￿￿














jlt)wjt + ￿wjt (77)
c1t + (1 + gt)k1t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)k1t = y1t (78)
c2t + (1 + gt)mt+1 ￿ mt + (￿ rw + ￿)k2t = y2t (79)
where ￿ rw +￿ = ￿
y2t
k2t, plus the four equations (59) and (60) and standard transversality conditions.
The pro￿t income from ￿nancial intermediaries is given by
￿t = (r1t ￿ ra
t )
Z
s1t(i)di = r1tk2t: (80)
Hence, equation (78) is also the goods market-clearing condition for the nontradable-goods sector.
Equation (79) is the household￿ s budget constraint in the export sector, where (￿ rw + ￿)k2t is rental
payment for capital services. Thus, income from exports is used to ￿nance imports of consumption
goods (c2), capital rental costs ((￿ rw + ￿)k2t), and foreign-reserve accumulation (mt+1 ￿ mt).
The model has a unique steady state. The eigenvalue method easily con￿rms that the steady
state is a saddle, so the general equilibrium path implied by the above system of dynamic equations
is unique near the steady state. To see the distortion e⁄ect of capital control, suppose ￿ = 0, so
that ￿￿
jlt = ￿￿


















where the coe¢ cient ’ 6= 1 measures e¢ ciency loss (or deadweight loss) due to capital controls.
The allocation would be e¢ cient if ’ = 1.
De￿ning }j as the total real disposable income in sector j, which includes wage income plus
real capital gains (i.e., interest income, if any), we have
}1t = W1tN1t + ￿t = X1t ￿ St (82)





The saving rate for each type of income in the economy is de￿ned as the ratio of net changes in












(1 + g)mt+1 ￿ mt
x2t ￿ mt
: (85)







, the steady-state household saving rate in sec-
tor j is given by
￿j =

























Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.
By rearrangement, the saving rate in equation (86) can be shown to be identical to equation
(19) in the benchmark model. So, as before, higher income growth can lead to a higher saving rate
instead of a higher propensity to consume. The national saving rate (the ratio of investment and net
exports to GDP) in the economy is given by
gk+egm
y1+eY2 , and the aggregate investment-to-GDP ratio
is given by
gk
y1+ey2. Because of trade surplus (gm > 0), the national saving rate exceeds domestic
investment rate even if the investment rate is high. For example, under the following parameter





y1+eY2 = 0:44. The calibrated values of f￿1;￿2g capture the relative sizes of the export and
the non-export sectors in China since total exports account for about 20% of GDP. The implied
national saving rate under these parameter values is 46% (not including government saving) while
the household saving rate in the tradable goods sector is
gm
y2 = 22%. Of the 46% national saving
rate, aggregate investment accounts for 42% of GDP and net exports accounts for 4% of GDP.
These magnitudes are consistent with Chinese data.
Appendix C (Not For Publication)
This appendix shows that the previous results do not hinge on the assumptions of capital
controls and a linked exchange rate. As in Appendix B, there are two production sectors in the
home country, one producing nontradable goods for domestic consumption and the other producing
53tradable goods for exports. There are no capital controls and the nominal exchange rate is ￿ exible.
The real exchange rate (the relative price of the tradable goods in terms of the nontradable goods)
is denoted by et. Households can choose to work in either sector and receive real wage Wjt in sector
j = 1;2. For simplicity and without loss of generality, there are no ￿xed capital and income shocks
(i.e., ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0). The production technology in sector j is given by Yjt = AtF(Njt), and
the competitive real wage is given by Wjt =
dYjt
dNjt. Applying the rescaling factor At￿1, we have
yjt = (1 + gt)F(Njt) and wjt = (1 + gt)F0(Njt).




￿t f￿t(i)[￿1 logc1t(i) + ￿2 logc2t(i)] ￿ N1t(i) ￿ N2t(i)g (87)
subject to
c1t(i) + etc2t(i) + (1 + gt) ~ mt+1(i) ￿ ~ mt(i) + w1tN1t(i) + etw2tN2t(i) + ￿1t + et￿2t (88)
~ mt+1(i) ￿ 0; (89)
where ~ mt denotes a portfolio of assets with a real gross rate of return equal to 1, and ￿jt denotes
the pro￿t income distributed from ￿rms in sector j. Because currencies are fully convertible, the
household faces only one budget constraint. The budget constraint implies that households can
combine income received from either sector to ￿nance consumption of both nontradable goods and
tradable goods, as well as asset accumulations.
Proposition 8 Denoting cash in hand as
xt ￿ ~ mt(i) + w1tN1t(i) + etw2tN2t(i) + ￿1t + et￿2t; (90)































xt = (￿1 + ￿2)￿￿
tR(￿￿
t)w1t; (94)












Proof. Similar to the proof in Proposition 1.







Compared with equation (81), lifting capital controls implies e¢ cient allocation here. However,
this e¢ ciency gain has no e⁄ect on the household saving rate, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 9 The current account surplus is given by









































(1 + gt) ~ mt+1 = H(￿￿
t)xt (102)
The budget constraint becomes
c1t + etc2t + (1 + gt) ~ mt+1 = ~ mt + w1tN1t + etw2tN2t + ￿1t + et￿2t: (103)
Since households own ￿rms, wage income plus pro￿t income should equal the value of output
in each sector:
wjtNjt + ￿jt = yjt: (104)
Hence, market clearing in the nontradable-goods sector implies
c1t = w1tN1t + ￿1t: (105)
55Equation (103) then implies
etc2t + (1 + gt) ~ mt+1 = ~ mt + ety2t: (106)
So the current account surplus is given by
CAt = ety2t ￿ etc2t = (1 + gt) ~ mt+1 ￿ ~ mt: (107)


















The aggregate saving rate is given by
￿t =






where the denominator is given by
y1t + ety2t = w1tN1t + ￿1t + etw2tN2t + et￿2t (110)
















So we have equation (99).
Notice that the saving rate is precisely the same as that in equation (25) in the benchmark
model (by setting ￿ = 0 and ￿￿
1 = ￿￿
2) and is also identical to that in the general model in Appendix
B (by setting ￿ = 0 in the production function). Clearly, both the current account and the national
saving rate are independent of the exchange rate et. In the steady state, the current account surplus
is given by
CA = g￿R(￿￿)H(￿￿); (111)
and the saving rate equals
￿ =
￿ gH(￿￿)
1 + ￿ g ￿ H(￿￿)
; (112)
which is identical to equation (20) in the benchmark model or equation (86) in the general model
(by setting ￿ = 0 and ￿ = 0).
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